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Abstract 
This thesis offers a contribution to current debates on the role of accountabi lity in aid 
effectiveness I, a concept which pervades development thought today. Through an 
exploration of the new architecture of aiti, this research provides an account of how 
definitions and applications of accountability influence strategies, how these strategies 
are translated into policy on the ground and what the consequences are. 
Using DFID as a case study, I approach this research in three stages. Firstly, I outline 
DFID's definitions and applications of accountability both nationally and internationally. 
Secondly, 1 describe DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies, with a specific focus on those 
strategies pursued in South Africa. And thirdly, I examine how these definitions and 
applications of accountability have influenced DFID implemented HIV I AIDS policies in 
South Africa and observe any consequences. 
My methods included the development of an overview of the evolution of the concept of 
accountability, a review of UK foreign policy for aid, and documentary reviews of both 
DFID's definitions and applications of accountability and DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies 
and implemented policy in South Africa. My analysis of the influence of accountability 
on implemented policies in South Africa and the observed consequences was 
strengthened by in-depth interviews with purposively selected infonnants. 
The meaning of accountability today is ambiguous. It can be attached to ideas about 
transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsibility, integrity, responsiveness, 
governance, corruption and fraud. It is easy to become confused when looking at 
accountability. 
I DFlD defines aid effectiveness as "a measure of quality of aid delivery and maximizing the impact of aid 
on poverty reduction and development" (DFlD Annual Report 2007:353). 
2 This term emerged in the 1990s and established itselfin the early years of the 21 st century and is used by 
DFlD in a number of its publications 
ii 
New accountability relationships are a great deal more complex than domestic 
accountability relationships because of the absence offonnal international structures and 
processes in place to implement this new (mutual) accountability. There is no existing 
specification of how donors and recipients are to successfully apply mutual 
accountability nor do they address the possibility that mutual accountability demands 
may conflict with domestic accountability demands. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This thesis presents evidence how definitions and applications of accountability influence 
strategies, how these strategies are translated into policy on the ground and what the 
consequences are. Using DFID as a case study, I approach this research in three stages. 
Firstly, I outline DFID's definitions and applications of accountability both nationally 
and internationally. Secondly, I describe DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies, with a specific 
focus on those strategies pursued in South Africa. And thirdly, I examine how these 
definitions and applications of accountability have influenced DFID implemented 
HIV / AIDS policies in South Africa and observe any consequences. 
Which strategies? 
All organisations, implement strategies aligned to their mission, goals and objectives 
(Behn 2001). Strategies chosen by a government donor also depend on a number of 
political, economic and social factors, including the type and structure of the 
organisation, and the type and extent of resources available (Dye 2002). For instance, in 
the case of aid/development strategies, security-related concerns are important to the 
United States, home country business interests playa role in Japan, and former colonial 
ties influence Britain, France and Portuguese decisions (Behn 2001). These criteria 
influence why and how donors choose particular strategies and not others. 
The new order "globalisation" has brought with it a shift in the focus of aid/development 
assistance (Plattner and Smolar 2000). In the 1990s Cold War strategies concerned with 
realpolitik diminished in favour of promoting and facilitating democracy. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall marked not only the end of the Cold War but also meant globalisation 
became both possible and desirable. Simultaneously national democratic values began to 
be applied on a global scale. This newfound sense of interconnectedness, influenced 
thinking and a new architecture of aid also emerged which embodied "both fundamental 
reform in the way aid is delivered and a substantial increase in the volume of aid to the 
world's poorest countries" (Birdsall and Williamson 2002). The new architecture of aid 
emphasises the importance of basic human rights, the reduction of poverty and is 
reflected in a new language of aid. The development agenda is dominated by terms 
concerned with aid effectiveness through partnership, coordination and harmonisation, 
conditionality, local country ownership and accountability (Riddell 2007). The doctrine 
of the new architecture of aid is that "individuals have rights, implies that governments 
and others have corresponding legal and moral obligations, and that they can be held to 
account for their actions to fulfil those responsibilities" (Eyben & Ferguson in Groves & 
Hinton 2004: 163). As a result, a recipient country's capacity to utilise aid effectively can 
infl uence donor strategies. Accountability has thus become a significant feature of many 
government donors' strategies to tackle poverty and increase development. 
Why accountability? 
Accountability is necessary for any organisation to be effective. All organisations depend 
on a structure which articulates the tasks, responsibilities and the internal relationships of 
the people within it. 
There are aspects to democracy which make accountability essential (Behn 2001). 
Accountability in a democracy provides legitimacy (Flinders 2001, Grant and Keohane 
2005 Blair 2000, Newell and Bellour 2002, Bovens 2007, Schedler et al 1999). In a 
democracy, governments can only be elected by the people and must remain accountable 
to the people through parliament in order to remain legitimate. lfa government (or any 
government department) does not act in accordance with its own democratic principles, 
delivering on promises and commitments in an accountable manner, it risks being 
sanctioned by its elected representatives, and ultimately by its citizens. 
The new architecture of aid has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Democratisation 
and globalisation have influenced ideas about the provision of development 
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assistance/aid. Under this new architecture of aid it is not enough to simply spend 
honestly; donors must now also spend fairly and spend effectively. In order to do this, 
and to prove that this is being done, complex and dynamic relationships have developed 
between donors and taxpayers, between donors and their own governments, between 
donors and recipient governments and between donors and local populations. As a result 
a new accountability has emerged. Government donors have begun to respond to 
stakeholders other than their own citizens and acknowledge the need for a more inclusive 
understanding of accountability (Eyben & Ferguson in Groves and Hinton 2004). New 
accountability is accountability that extends beyond the borders of the nation-state. 
New accountability in the era of globalisation and global democracy has complicated 
traditional state-centric understandings of accountability. States are now bound by rules 
and codes which extend beyond their boundaries. Government departments (including 
those responsible for distributing development assistance/aid) need to be seen to be 
legitimate not just to their own electorate but local governments and local populations. 
Included in new accountability is the conception and application of mutual accountability 
which emphasises the shared nature of development goals between two or more parties. 
Each party has a right or legitimate claim that the other is responsible for fulfilling or 
respecting, and each may be required to explain how they have discharged their 
responsibilities and be sanctioned if they fail to deliver (DFID 2005a). The application of 
these accountability relationships can profoundly influence the strategies pursued and 
what happens in practice. 
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Introduction to the case study 
In this thesis I present evolving donor definitions and applications of accountability, 
consider how these shape strategies and explore the consequences of these on 
implemented policies/delivery, using the United Kingdom's Department for International 
Development (DFID) as a case study. DFID is a pertinent case for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the United Kingdom (UK) is a major donor of overseas development assistance. 
Most recent figures show that the UK's Gross Public Expenditure on Development 
(GPEX) amounted to £6.027m in 2007/08 UK's Gross Public Expenditure on 
Development (GPEX) amounted to £6.027m in 2007/08 (DFID 2008). The DFID aid 
programme accounted for £S.2m (86 per cent) of this expenditure (DFID 2008) and DFID 
are expected to spend £7.9 billion by 2010/11 reaching the international aid target of 0.7 
per cent of national income by 2013 (DFID 2008). 
Secondly, DFID has a good reputation as a bilateral donor. In 2006, a Review of the 
Development Cooperation Policies and Programmes of the UK found that "the UK is 
currently seen by many aid practitioners and donors as one of the bilateral models for 
today's evolving world of development co-operation" (OECD 2006a: 1 0). The report cites 
'consistent clarity of vision', a 'clear legislative mandate', a lean and well managed 
delivery system, a well defined, unambiguous relationship with other departments, a 
unified government approach and coherent policy direction, and high calibre and highly 
motivated staff as some of the reasons DFID has been judged to have excelled as a 
government donor (OECD 2006a: 1 0). 
Thirdly, since its creation in 1997, DFID has adopted the principles of the new 
architecture of aid. This includes a mission-statement which promises to combat 
international poverty through rights-based approaches (Eyben and Ferguson 2004) as 
well as a commitment to make aid more effective through greater local ownership, better 
coordination and more inclusive accountability. DFID places heavy emphasis on the 
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importance of accountability, both nationally and internationally and has been influential 
in placing accountability high on the aid effectiveness agenda. 
DFID's HWIAIDS strategies in South Africa 
To examine the ways in which definitions and applications of accountability shapes 
donor strategies and to consider the consequences of these on policies I decided to focus 
on lIlV /AIDS strategies in South Africa. Through interviews with people who have 
experience in DFID's international response to IIIV/AIDS across the policy cycle, I was 
able to gain in-depth knowledge of DFID's work and obtain specific examples of how 
applications of accountability have affected its HIV/AIDS policy work in South Africa. 
The UK government has a long standing history with Africa initially through trade, 
including the slave trading, then colonisation and today through trade and aid policies. 
Africa is steeped in colonial history and many of the current problems across the 
continent are attributable to its largely British colonial past. Therefore the UK has some 
degree of responsibility to help these countries that they formerly ruled. To do this 
legitimately it must be accountable for what it does so that it is not seen as self interested 
(as was generally the case during colonialism and through much of the late 20th Century 
due to the Cold War). 
In the last twenty years, development in sub Saharan Africa has been severely hampered 
by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. "Africa's condition of extreme poverty, contlict, weak 
institutional and physical infrastructure has provided an ideal environment for the spread 
of HlV/AIDS (Poku and Sandkjaer 2007: 14).22 million people out of the estimated 32.9 
million round the world living with HlV/AIDS are living in Africa (UNAIDS 2007). As a 
result there is a heavy emphasis from government donors on prioritising a response to 
HlV/AIDS. The UK government, through DFID, is currently one of the largest donors for 
lIlY/AIDS programmes across the world and the second biggest bilateral donor on HIV 
and AIDS - spending £466 909 000 in 2005106 CDFlD 2006a). 
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South Africa provides a critical case in which the consequences of the new architecture 
of aid can be explored in depth because it represents a challenge to the new architecture 
of aid and specifically to the principle of mutual accountability. 
Despite having one of the strongest economies in Africa, South Africa has one of the 
largest AIDS epidemics in the world (UNAlDS 2008). Aid/foreign assistance to South 
Africa has long been tied up in its complex history and poor or inadequate response to 
HIV and AIDS: 
South Africa's history has been bloody and exploitative, but there are important differences from 
other countries. Firstly, the system was based on racial discrimination and after 1948 this was 
institutionalised and legalised. Secondly, the past 20 years have been characterised by mobile 
populations and a breakdown in social structures. Thirdly South Africa has high levels of 
urbanisation and a large white minority. The AIDS epidemic reflects the history of this region 
(Barnett and Whiteside 2006: 147) 
South Africa's relatively strong economic position means that it is not aid dependent (like 
other African countries that have been heavily affected by HIV / AIDS) and therefore has 
the power to reject the requirements of donor governments in favour of its own strategies. 
This is nowhere more apparent than in South Africa's response to HlV/AIDS which has 
long been at odds with internationally agreed responses to the epidemic. This creates a 
dilemma for donors. Due to South Africa's history and the AIDS epidemic, it is difficult 
for donors to completely withdraw aid. 
Donors cannot withhold aid - '1he sheer magnitude of human suffering - not to mention 
security, commercial concerns and historical ties - argues against walking away" 
(Pomerantz 2004: 18). Donors need to retain sufficient influence on how the money is 
used to satisfy their own national accountability requirements and at the same time find 
ways of discharging their promise to the people they have committed to help. When 
relationships between donors and recipients break down, identifying alternative channels 
for providing assistance offers a solution - such as using Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) or private consultancies. The irony is however, that in doing this 
aid often becomes less transparent and less accountable. 
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This thesis presents a comprehensive review of how new accountability's defined and 
applied by DFID and the consequences both intended and unintended for HJV I AIDS 
policy implementation in South Africa. 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 describes my methodology used. Chapter 3 describes the historical evolution of 
accountability. Accountability is defined and a system for exploring accountability 
relationships is presented. Chapter 4 provides a review of the changing approach to 
international development and aid. This chapter provides some of the background 
necessary to understand how the new architecture of aid came into being bringing with it 
new accountability. 
Chapters 5 and 6 both deal directly with DFID. Chapter 5 provides a description of how 
DFID both defines and applies accountability. In this chapter I establish to who DFID 
considers itself accountable and assess to what degree DFID is actually held to account. 
Chapter 6 explores DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa. I investigate the 
strategies in terms of how long they have been pursued, how much money has been spent 
and how many other resources have been provided. 
In Chapter 7, I use the infonnation gained from my interviews to identify the linkages 
between DFID's evolving definitions and applications of accountability (Chapter 5) with 
its on the ground HIVI AIDS policies (outlined in Chapter 6) . 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents my findings and offers my conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 - Methodology 
Summary 
In this chapter I describe my approach to assessing evidence about definitions and 
applications of accountability, in particular with respect to DFID. Firstly, I describe how 
the concept of accountability has evolved over time. Secondly, I identify when new 
accountability became important in aid through a review of UK foreign aid. Thirdly, J 
examine DFID's understandings of its accountability relationships. Fourthly, I look at the 
HIV/AIDS strategies pursued by DFID and identify some of the ways they have been 
implemented in South Africa. Finally, using my accumulated evidence and insights from 
interviews with a small purposively selected sample of informants I consider some of the 
consequences for accountability. 
This is a qualitative piece of research which aims to establish some connections between 
definitions and applications of accountability, policies pursued and the consequences for 
accountability. Firstly, I will begin the chapter by discussing the case study methodology 
used in this piece of research. Secondly, I will describe my approach to creating the 
historical review of aid/development assistance policy and the development of the new 
architecture of aid. Thirdly, I will describe the document review that led to the 
development of my overview of DFID's understandings of accountability. Fourthly, I 
will illustrate the document review that describes DFID's response to HIV/AIDS with a 
focus on South Africa. 
Finally, I illustrate the methodology employed in the empirical part of my research - key 
informant interviews. I explain how I chose my small group of informants, the 
development of my interview guide, and ethical considerations. 
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The Case Study 
Case studies provide an insight into the context of phenomena and are frequently selected 
as a useful methodological approach in the field of sociology (Yin 2003). A case study is 
valuable in this exploratory piece of research because there is no developed theory or set 
of hypotheses, there are no readily accessible data and it would be difficult to observe 
these key factors across multiple cases. A case study therefore provides the opportunity to 
relate documentary evidence to the perspectives of informants involved at different points 
in the policy process and within the specific context of South Africa. 
Historical Evolution of Accountability 
In order to fully explain why understandings of accountability are important in examining 
donor strategies it was important to provide some historical context of development aid in 
general. My methodology included a review of the literature in this area beginning with 
key texts on the topic, followed by materials selected from their reference sections. In 
addition 1 searched the internet for relevant writing as well as browsing academic journal 
websites. I also obtained information from UK Parliamentary and Government of South 
Africa websites for supporting historical documents on the topic. 
Review of UK Foreign Policy for Aid 
I divided my document review into two sections, the first examining DFID's 
understandings of accountability through publications, its official line on accountability. 
The second section comprised a review of all of DFID's policy and strategy papers on 
H IV/AIDS, and in particular I looked for evidence of its strategies in South Africa. Both 
stages of the data collection involved an extensive review of information rich documents 
regarding UK Government policy, programme and strategy publications. Access to 
documentation in the public domain provided the majority of information, in part to test 
the transparency of DFID's reporting. These publications focus on DFID, but include 
other documentation where necessary. 
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The document review was conducted for the following reasons: 
• To create a descriptive account of DFID's definitions and applications of 
accountability and its HIV / AIDS strategies. 
• To gain a sense of the language ofDFID. Does this language match the language 
of the new architecture ofaiel! 
• To provide a backdrop against which to set the analysis of the interviews; and 
• To serve as a context for the insights provided by my informants. 
1. DFID's understandings of accountability 
In discussing how DF1D understands accountability (Chapter 3) ] use a thematic 
approach, exploring how DFID understands accountability at both a domestic level 
(DFID to UK taxpayers and to the UK parliament) and an international level (DFID to 
the recipient government and to poor people in the recipient country). I use my 
conceptual framework to describe DFID's accountability relationships. 
Guided by my accountability framework I read documents with the following questions 
in mind: 
• Does DFID directly use the term accountability or is it implied? 
• Does DFID define the term? If so, how? 
• Who does DFID see itself as being accountable to? For what? Why? And how? 
• Is DFID subject to all levels of accountability - Reporting? Answerability? 
Enforceabi I ity? 
2. DFID's strategies for HIV/AIDS in South Africa 
The second part of the document review, in which T examine DFID's strategies for HIV 
and AIDS (Chapter 4), focuses on the strategies it has pursued in South Africa. I outline 
what these strategies are (bilateral, multilateral, financial assistance, technical assistance 
etc.). 
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Guided by my literature review I read documents with the following questions in mind: 
• How does DFID generally distribute aid? And more specifically aid for 
HIV/AIDS? 
• What is DFTD's strategic response to HIV/AIDS? What has it been doing in South 
Africa? 
• What are DFID's priorities in the response to HIV/AIDS? 
• What policies have been implemented by DFlD in South Africa 
Key Informant Interviews 
The empirical phase of data collection comprised interviews conducted to explore the 
relationship between accountability and strategy. This phase involved semi-structured 
interviews over a six month period in the UK and South Africa with informants working 
within the policy cycle. 
Other experts in the field who have knowledge of and or direct/indirect relationships with 
the donors were interviewed to provide supplementary information. All people 
interviewed had expertise of donor strategies for HIV / AIDS and insight into DFlD. 
Participant sam piing and recruitment 
Purposive sampling 
My sample was small in scale and purposively selected on the basis of salient criteria. As 
my resources were limited I decided to use purposive sampling. With such a small 
sample I established criteria for selection. The key to this approach was to choose 
informants with expertise. I wanted people with: 
A) Specialised knowledge and experience in international development, and in particular 
Africa and HIV / AIDS. 
B) People with particular substantive knowledge in South Africa and its history. 
C) People located within the policy cycle. 
1 1 
Locating informants within the policy cycle became my key guide to selection. 
Respondents selected needed to have a current role which had to be in one of the four 
stages of the policy cycle. Of course, the fact that these people were also often 
experienced in other areas of the policy cycle added to the depth and range of their 
perceptions. The classic policy cycle is problem identification, agenda setting, 
implementation and evaluation (Figure I.). 
Problem Identification Agenda Setting 
Evaluation Implementation 
Figure I. Classical Policy Cycle 
Steets (2004) was interested in accountability in terms of partnerships. In order to 
establish the right level of accountability depending on the political function of the 
partnership she adapted the classical policy cycle: 
• Problem identification (knowledge-building and awareness raising) 
• Policy formation (standard setting) 
• Policy implementation (service provision and implementation) 
• Policy evaluation (monitoring and feedback) 
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I selected people with expertise (both current and historical) in international responses to 
HIV/AIDS and accountability across the policy cycle. I decided to select informants who 
were currently working in a role in each of the four stages. To do this I created a basic 
profile for each potential informant to ensure that J got a good enough fit in terms of my 
criteria for selection. 
Respondent 1 - Problem Identification (knowledge-building and awareness raising) 
I looked for an academic or evidence-based practitioner expert in international 
development, Africa, and HTV / AIDS. The respondent selected is a South African with 
expertise in public health and in HTV/AIDS in particular. This respondent also has a 
history of experience within South Africa and in terms of HIV/AIDS internationally. 
They have a good understanding of policy and issues of delivery with previous 
experience of evaluation and of consultancy with policy makers. 
Respondent 2 - Policy Formation (standard setting) 
I aimed to find a Westminster politician if possible with an excellent understanding of 
political accountability and speciflca\1y of DFID as a government department and its 
policies. An interest in, and current involvement with Africa and HIV / AIDS were seen as 
an advantage. T was fortunate to get an MP as my respondent. This MP has membership 
of key parliamentary committees on international development and Africa including 
HIV / AIDS in Africa. 
Respondent 3 - Implementation (service provision/implementation) 
I wanted someone on the ground, working on implementation of HIV aids strategies in 
Southern Africa, preferably with previous experience at the problem identification or 
policy formulation stage within government or a major NGO. The respondent selected is 
currently working on HIV / AIDS delivery in Southern Africa and has previous experience 
both in a government department and an NGO working on problem identification and 
policy formulation in HIV / AIDS. 
Respondent 4 - Policy Evaluation (monitoring and feedback) 
I wanted someone who is currently involved in scrutinising government performance in 
terms of overseas aid - what is spent, how it is spent and whether it has an impact - an 
academic or a civil servant. Respondent selected is currently a civil servant but with both 
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academic and NGO experience of Africa and HIV/AIDS. 
As accountability is such a complex concept and because 1 require information from 
individuals that have highly specialized roles, the sample was not designed to be 
representative .Instead, I purposively sought informants who, from the vantage of their 
particular positions, could provide information to augment and illustrate the documentary 
evidence J had collected. 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited through a letter formally inviting them to take part in the 
study (see Appendix A). Before each interview, 1 reviewed the Consent Form with each 
participant and obtained written consent (see Appendix B). 
Development of the interview guide 
My interview guide was based on information gathered by applying the information I had 
gathered from my document reviews. I then added questions aimed at exploring questions 
raised by such information. 
Interviews with key informants 
The interviews were semi-structured using open-ended questions, a conversation with a 
purpose. They were conducted in person where possible and by telephone otherwise. 
Follow-up interviews were conducted when necessary either on the telephone or via 
email. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed where possible. 
Interviews were conducted individually to provide personal accounts, explore issues in 
depth and detail and to gauge understandings of accountability at each stage of the policy 
process. 
Ethical Considerations 
Some sensitivities arose from conducting this piece of research, for example where 
DFJD employees may have found some questions required information that they were not 
able to give. To encourage participation I made sure that I received permission to identify 
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participants when reporting on this study, but agreed not to attach names to particular 
ideas or quotes. 
Limitations 
For this piece of research to have been more reflective of donor organizations in general 
my research design would have compared many cases of donors so that there could be 
variance in understandings of accountability. As such it would have been possible to 
examine correlations between understandings of accountability and policy outcomes. Due 
to time and resource constraints this was not possible. Although informants' roles and 
identities are not revealed, nevertheless there was concern among all of them about 
confidentiality and to this extent their insights into how definitions ani applications of 
accountability have shaped DFID strategies for HIV I AIDS in South Africa and 
consequences of these strategies were sometimes explicitly constrained. In particular, it 
was especially difficult to get informants to reveal any information about HLSP (the 
contractor DFID uses in South Africa). DFID Enquiries did not respond to emails or 
replied with information I had not asked for. 
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Chapter 3 - An overview of the historical evolution of 
acco untability 
Accountability is one o/those golden concepts that no one can be against. It is increasingly used 
in political discourse and policy documents because it conveys an image o/transparency and 
trustworthiness. However, its evocative powers make it also a very elusive concept because it can 
mean many different things to different people (Bovens 2007:5) 
Summary 
This chapter explores the evolving meanings of accountability and interprets them within 
the context of international development aid. I show how a new accountability has 
emerged as domestic concepts of accountability are applied internationally and highlight 
the consequent complexities of doing this. Since accountability arises across a number of 
disciplines (Dubnick 2004) and is widely interpreted, my research refers to social science 
theory acquired from a variety of disciplines - linguistics, sociology, political science and 
management theory. 
In this chapter I will establish a framework of accountability using established literature. 
It is important to note that this chapter is not a critique of the existing concepts of 
accountability but instead I am using the literature to outline a generally accepted 
framework. I will then apply this framework to DFID (Chapter 5) in order to establish 
how DFID understands accountability and how this in turn influences policy and 
strategies for HJV / AIDS in South Africa. 
Firstly, J offer a broad definition of the concept of accountability. J then present a brief 
overview of the origins of accountability and how its meaning has evolved over time. 
Thirdly, I focus on accountability in governance because of its pertinence to my thesis. I 
explain the processes of accountability. Finally, I describe how new accountability has 
emerged from the applications of domestic accountability internationally and highlight 
the complexities of this new accountability. 
16 
A broad definition of accountability 
A relationship between an actor and a forum 
As the opening quotation from Bovens suggests, accountability is a complex and elusive 
concept which can be interpreted in an extremely broad way (Behn 2001, Dubnick and 
Romzek 1993, Flinders,2001). That accountability is an amorphous concept is the one 
thing scholars agree upon. It is therefore essential to provide a baseline definition. 
At its simplest accountability exists when there is a relationship between two entities (an 
actor and a forum) where one entity (the actor) agrees to carry out tasks or functions and 
agrees to explain and justifY its conduct. The other entity (the forum) can then pose 
questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences. 
The three levels of accountability 
Three levels of accountability can be identified: reporting, answerability and 
enforceability; at the reporting level accountability is weakest and at the level of 
enforceability it is strongest. Reporting is when an individual or group of people (forum) 
who are affected by an action or decision can demand information about what has been 
done. Such information must include details about inputs, procedures and/or outcomes. 
Often the actor must also provide explanations and justifications, particularly in the case 
of fail ures or incidents. However, as the forum has no power to do anything with the 
information provided. Answerability - the second level of accountability is stronger as 
the forum, having been provided with the information, should then be able to scrutinise 
that information and receive an explanation and response for why such actions were 
taken. At this level of accountability the forum is able to test the legitimacy of the 
information given at the reporting stage. At the third level of accountability -
enforceability - the forum has authority over the actor to pass judgement on their conduct 
and they must face the possibility of consequences (Keohane 2002, Bovens 2007). 
Enforceability is the strongest level of accountability as it provides the forum with the 
power to do something about the actions of the actor. The threat of facing the 
consequences can make people behave in a more accountable manner so enforceability 
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can act as a deterrent (Behn 200 I). In order to be fully accountable, all three levels must 
be applied. Without enforceability, accountability can only be partial. 
Processes of accountability 
Accountability operates through vertical and horizontal processes. Vertical accountability 
provides the means by which citizens, mass media and civil society can demand 
legitimacy from their governments. Citizens impose accountability on their governments 
(Schacter, 2001) . Citizens may act directly through the electoral process and through 
contact with Members of ParI iament (MPs), by withholding compliance or protest. They 
may act indirectly through mass media and civil society. Citizens and civil society groups 
may also seek the support oftheir elected representatives to intervene on their behalf. 
Horizontal accountability processes are created by the state in order to provide a check on 
its own abuses and inetTlciencies. It is self-imposed accountability that operates within 
the state as a restraint primarily on executive power through other state institutions and 
independent bodies. Horizontal accountability may be exercised by the judiciary, 
executive and legislature as well as anti-corruption bodies, auditors general, electoral and 
human rights commissions and other ombudsmen (Newell and Bellour,2002). 
The origins and evolution of accountability 
From bookkeeping to accountability 
Accountability in the UK can be traced all the way back to William the Conqueror and 
the Doomsday book when the king demanded that his citizens be held to account (Bovens 
2007). Accountability then related directly to financial accounting and was relatively 
strai ghtforward. 
The origins of accountability as we see it today can be located in the liberal tradition of 
Locke, Montesquieu and the American Federalists. The democratisation of the US, 
marked by the adoption of the American Constitution in 1787, has been identified as a 
key event in shaping western conceptions of accountability (Dowdle 2006). With this 
18 
new constitution, elections provided the means by which citizens could hold the 
government to account. The real innovation in terms of accountability emerged from the 
separation of powers in the US which marked the beginning of horizontal accountability. 
In the UK, where there is no formal constitution, the parliamentary system known as The 
Westminster Model shapes definitions and applications of accountability. Authority is 
granted to an executive, known as cabinet ministers, lead by the Prime Minister. The 
model is founded upon the assumption that ministers have both an individual and 
collective responsibility to Parliament. The House of Commons, the lower house of 
Parliament, comprises the peoples' elected representatives. Their designated role is to 
enact the legislation that establishes the fundamental principle of the rule of law. Under 
the Westminster model most legislation is initiated by the Executive and if agreed is 
passed by Parliament. In the UK Parliamentary accountability is weaker than the US 
because the executive and legislature are fused. 
American notions of accountability influenced how accountability is applied in the UK at 
the end of the Second World War in 1945, when the United States helped to rebuild 
European states (Dowdle, 2006). By introducing their vision of accountability to Western 
Europe, bureaucratic regulation became increasingly embedded in both public 
international law and the legal and political environments of many countries including the 
UK. 
Economic stagnation in both the USA and the UK in the 1970's caused an increased 
alarm about government performance, inefficient use of, and abuse of, power. Therefore, 
many institutions and organisations, including the US and UK governments adopted a 
more market-based approach to accountability. By providing monetary incentives they 
believed public resources would be more efficiently allocated and more responsibly used 
(Dowdle 2006). In the UK new governance architectures were invented that "replicated 
market-like forces of competition, by having different public departments, 'compete' in 
the development of effective regulation" (Dowdle 2006:6). This instance of broadening 
accountability is an example of how accountability has been expanded over time. 
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Domestic accountability for all 
The end of the Cold War marked an important moment in the evolution of the concept of 
accountability as the rapid spread of democratisation led to the expansion of domestic 
accountability to an increasing number of countries. Democracy, it was believed, had 
triumphed and accountability was seen as one of the most important instruments of 
democracy. (Newell and BeHour 2002). Domestic accountability became a cornerstone of 
good governance, thus, legitimising public power. It provides a means by which elected 
representatives and other officials must justify their actions (Newell & Bellour 2002, 
Wenar 2006). 
No longer restricted by the Cold War strategies concerned with realpolitik, donors began 
exhorting domestic accountability as a measure of good governance to recipient 
countries. 
NewaccountabiHty 
At the same time, countries began to globalise "marked by a proliferation of political 
settings beyond domestic boundaries (Cohen and Sabel 2004:763). This involved 
increasing global rule-making and standard setting as well as the application of 
domestically formulated accountability mechanisms internationally: a new accountability 
emerged (Sabel and Cohen 2004). Notions of domestic accountability were both adopted 
by countries as a means of ensuring good governance in Central Europe, Asia and Africa 
and by donors as criteria, and thus a test of continued aid. 
Both the advance of technical and economic growth at the end of the cold war facilitated 
a rapid proliferation of globalised networks of bilateral and multi-lateral relationships and 
with it new forms of regional global governance. Global politics have played a significant 
role in changing the way we think about accountability. 
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States and other organisations exert effects over great distances; peoples' lives can be 
fundamentally changed, or ended, as a result of decisions made only days or moments earlier, 
thousands of miles away (Keohane 2002:10). 
New forms of both multilateral and multinational politics have blurred the boundaries of 
accountability in terms of who is accountable, to whom, for what, how and why. In a 
world where "transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national 
communities in diverse ways, and where powerful states make decisions not just for their 
peoples but for others as well, the questions of who should be accountable to whom, and 
on what basis, do not easily resolve themselves. Overlapping spheres of influence, 
interference and interest create dilemmas at the centre of democratic thought" (Held and 
Mepham, 2007:56). 
The new architecture o.laid has changed the relationship between rich and poor 
countries. A new language has emerged where countries, no longer categorised as 
'donors' and 'recipients', are now referred to as 'development partners'. This expression 
of partnership has been accompanied by new-found shared responsibilities and mutual 
accountability. Mutual accountability requires common goals and purposes: 
Making donors more accountable to recipients could encourage them to improve their aid 
practices, and more leadership by recipients in the aid relationship itself could promote better 
country ownership (De Renzio and Mulley 2006) 
Although it is clear why the concept of mutual accountability has emerged, very little 
consideration has been given to how this might be applied. Theoretically, donors and 
recipients are united in their objectives to reduce poverty and human suffering and this 
makes it possible for 'partners' to form mutual accountability relationships. In practice 
donors and recipients do not always agree on policy and both must meet their own 
domestic accountability if they are to remain legitimate in the eyes of their people and 
their parliaments. 
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Complexities of new accountability 
It is clear that accountability today is expansive. Commentators have drawn attention to 
the difficulties in defining accountability today. The problem lies in the fact that the 
concept of domestic accountability has simply been applied internationally with no 
consideration for the fact that there is no global democracy. Grant and Keohane provide a 
succinct explanation of the difficulties of applying accountability to global politics: 
If governance above the level of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a democratic era, 
mechanisms for appropriate accountability need to be institutionalised. Yet these 
mechanisms cannot simply replicate, on a larger scale, the familiar procedures and 
practices of democratic states (2005:29). 
Mutual accountability relationships are particularly complex, largely because there is an 
obvious power imbalance between donor and recipients. Donors determine both the 
quantity and quality of aid/development assistance. They monitor recipient performance. 
Recipients, however, have little influence and few mechanisms for monitoring the donors 
(De Renzio and Mulley 2006). 
Donors and recipients often differ greatly on the specific strategies that should be 
employed to meet shared objectives: 
Many times, donors interpret this as a problem of political will. In turn, this begets a suspicion 
that there really isn't a common purpose (Pomerantz 2004:24.) 
The recipient government is left with the impression that donors do not understand the 
realities on the ground, and even more damaging, that donors don't trust them 
(Pomerantz 2004:24). There is no direct feedback loop that allows recipients to influence 
strategy formulation in donor countries (De Renzio and Mulley 2006). 
Mutual accountability is complicated further by the fact that both donors and recipients 
are not just accountable to each other. Donors and recipients are bound by multiple 
accountabilities to their own people and their own governments. In upholding 
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accountability to its own people and its own government a donor may not fulfil its 
commitment to the recipient or vice versa. 
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Chapter 4 - An overview of UK Foreign Policy for Aid 
In this chapter I provide an overview of British Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and UK aid policy as well as the new architecture for aid. I pay particular attention to the 
context in which the approach to aid to Africa has changed during the last century and 
explore how global changes (as well as changes in the UK government system) have 
shaped the UK's approach to development assistance. 
Foreign aid and the evolution of British policy for development 
Colonial - 1947 
The British aid programme, particularly to Africa, is "rooted in colonial history" (Barder 
2005: 1). In colonial times the British government opposed the provision of aid to the 
colonies, arguing that the local administrations should be responsible for their running 
costs. Aid was generally only given in times of emergencies (Barder 2005). The only aid 
- as the word is used today - for health, education and general services to the poor was 
provided by voluntary organisations, particularly religious groups (Riddell 2007). Only in 
1929 did British government begin to address the issue of non-administrative aid under 
the Colonial Act. It was not aimed primarily at improving the lives of the local 
inhabitants but at increasing trade through economic development. 
Discontent in the colonies and imperial decline between 1935 and 1938 led to increased 
funding through the Colonial and Development Welfare Act of 1940. This "extended the 
purposes of the Colonial Development Act to include the welfare of the colonies" (Barder 
2005:4). The end of the Second World War in 1945 brought in a Labour government 
which believed that it was essential to develop the colonies. With the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1945, the government attempted to expand agricultural 
production through research stations, extension programs, promotion of technology, and 
conservation. According to Barder (2005) this increased aid over ten years to £ 120 
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million (about $6.5 billion in 2007 prices). In 1947 Britain's first aid programmes were 
established through the Overseas Resources Act which was the first time that aid aimed 
to help the local people rather than just benefiting Britain (Barder 2005). 
The 1950s and 1960s 
In January 1949 US President Harry Truman launched a global appeal to help the poor in 
his inaugural address: 
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is 
inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their 
poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time 
in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people 
(Truman 1949). 
Riddell agrees that "the last few years of the 1940s are usually sited as the time when the 
modern era of aid giving is said to have begun" (2007:24). Truman was the first political 
leader to outline why and how governments should help poor countries. He encouraged 
other countries to make the same commitments. America was already giving aid to 
Europe in the fonn of The Marshall Plan of 1948 where US$13 billion was pledged by 
the US to Europe - a figure worth US$85 billion in today's prices (RiddeLl 2007). 
The Marshall Plan was not development aid as such but its success inspired optimism that 
capital and technical assistance could transfonn economies quickly elsewhere such as 
Africa (Barder 2005). The post war boom spread to less developed countries and it was 
widely assumed that they would 'modernise'. Prospects for growth and development 
seemed largely unproblematic. Early development assistance was mainly technical 
cooperation. In Britain the government began to provide budgetary grants, technical 
assistance grants and concessionary loans to Commonwealth and some non 
Commonwealth countries. (Barder 2005). 
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Figure 2. Resolution of the Development Assistance Group's Common Aid 
Effort 
• Conscious of the aspirations of the less-developed countries to achieve 
improving standards of life for their peoples; 
• Convinced of the need to help the less-developed countries help 
themselves by increasing economic, financial and technical assistance 
and by adapting this assistance to the requirements of the recipient 
countries; 
• Agree to recommend to Members that they should make it their common 
objective to secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources 
made available to the less developed countries and to improve their 
effectiveness; 
• Agree that assistance provided on an assured and continuing basis 
would make the greatest contribution to sound economic growth in the 
less-developed countries; 
• Agree that, while private and public finance extended on commercial 
terms is valuable and should be encouraged, the needs of some of the 
less-developed countries at the present time are such that the common 
aid effort should provide for expanded assistance in the form of grants or 
loans on favourable terms, including long maturities where this is 
justified in order to prevent the burden of external debt from becoming 
too heavy; 
A significant policy shift occurred in 1960 following a speech by Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan known as "The Winds of Change" speech. This speech signalled Britain's 
intention to decolonise its African territories and encourage African self-government, but 
it also affected Britain's relationship with Apartheid South Africa: 
The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of 
national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept this fact, and our national policies 
must take account of it. (Wilson /960). 
The "Winds of Change" speech referred to the Cold War which was to become a major 
influence on aid-giving from the West to Africa in coming decades. From then on aid 
became an important inducement by the superpowers and their allies to keep the 
governments of the newly emerging nation states on their side and lure others into their 
camp. Under these circumstances development became a propaganda tool that both 
capitalist and communist camps used to prove their systems were better. 
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In 1960 the OEEC which was to become the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) the following year with the inclusion of the USA and Canada, 
formed a forum called the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Collectively, they 
agreed the Common Aid Effort O. 
Throughout the 1960s, Britain supported aid as a common good and because it 
encouraged trade (Barder 2005). In 1964 the government created a Ministry of Overseas 
Development (ODM) separate from the Foreign Office and headed by a cabinet minister 
so that its aims would not be confused with British foreign interests (Barder 2005). 
Despite these high ideals, there was no significant increase in aid spending and, from 
1967, the ODM was no longer represented in Cabinet although it remained a separate 
government department. 
At the end of the 1960's the post-war boom faltered in many Northern countries and 
pessimism towards overseas development grew. (King and McGrath 2004). This 
produced two responses from the World Bank. According to Riddell, "both presented an 
approach to development based on the notion that to tackle poverty it was insufficient 
merely to try and raise growth rates ... to try to stimulate structural and institutional 
changes would - eventually and mostly indirectly - lead to a reduction in poverty" 
(2007:31-32). 
A Commission on International Development set up in 1969 and led by former Canadian 
Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, set out to tackle the increasing complexity of aid and the 
growing concern that it was proving ineffective. Although the Commission 
acknowledged that donors had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the recipient was 
serious about development, it also argued that the donor-recipient partnership must be 
driven by recipient governments if it was to be effective: 
Developing countries cannot reach for ambitious goals unless they know that sen'ous programs 
willfind external support, They are entitled to ask what commitments aid-givers are ready to make 
27 
and how these commitments will be lived up to. Performance is not a one way street (Commission 
on International Development 1969: 17). 
The Commission for International Development argued against uniform policies and 
targets and suggested that the only universal target for the South should be an average 
GNP growth of 6% per annum (1969: 124). 
The 1970s and 1980s 
A significant shift in the aid discourse occurred at the beginning of the 1970s with the 
appointment of Robert McNamara, a former Secretary of State for Defense, to lead the 
World Bank. Under McNamara the World Bank came to the forefront of the 'War 
Against Poverty'. McNamara believed that poverty could be tackled and eradicated if 
basic infrastructure was put in place (King and McGrath 2004, Riddell 2007). 
The impact of this thinking on aid-giving was quite dramatic, and neither aid-giving nor 
the discourse about aid for development were to be the same again. To the present day, 
donors have successively swung between the extreme views that development aid is best 
deployed to assist poor people, or that it is best deployed in accelerating and helping to 
shape the process of wealth creation, contributing to poverty alleviation more indirectly 
(Riddell 2007:32). 
In Britain in 1970, a Conservative government incorporated the ODM into the Foreign 
Office and called it the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) overseen by a 
Minister of State in the Foreign Office. (Barder 2005). Four years later a Labour 
government revived it and appointed a cabinet minister to run it. A more fundamental 
change in British foreign and aid policies came in 1975 when a White Paper on aid, The 
Changing Emphasis on British Aid Policies: More help for the poorest (Ministry for 
Overseas Development 1975), adopted the 'basic needs' approach. 
"Donorsfocused their aidfar more on particular sectors and sub-sectors of aid-recipient 
economies and gave far greater prominence to aid provided in the form of discrete projects - on 
education, health and water - aimed at reaching down to and helping poor people directly" 
(Riddell 2007:32j. 
In 1975 the Labour government removed the Minister of Overseas Development from the 
Cabinet although the department remained technically separate from the Foreign Office. 
In 1979 the Conservatives under Mrs Thatcher cut overseas aid and put the renamed 
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Overseas Development Administration back under Foreign Office control as a tool of a 
"Britain first" foreign policy. "The result was a significant expansion of the Aid and 
Trade Provision, and a number of bilateral aid projects designed to support British 
businesses including steel mills, Leyland buses, Hawker-Siddeley aircraft, and Westland 
helicopters." (Barder 2005 :9). 
The following year (1980) the Independent Commission on International Development 
issued a report called North-South: A Programme for Survival, known as the Brandt 
Report. Updated as The Common Crisis in 1983, the report focused on international 
interdependence and asserted that the rich must assist the poor and disadvantaged or lose 
out if they did not. The first Brandt report (like Pearson) called for the doubling of 
Overseas Development Assistance by 1985 in order to reach the target of 0.7% of GNP to 
be given in aid by rich countries. It proposed that 1 % should be achieved by 1990 
(Riddell 2007:35). 
The Brandt reports ignored, and then dismissed a new ideological orthodoxy that was 
spreading in the USA, one that would impact greatly on the South, particularly Africa. 
Neo-liberal ideology argued that countries in the South largely had themselves to blame 
for their development failure. To make them more globally competitive it was proposed 
that their economies must undergo radical restructuring (Hanlon 1991). 
The Brandt reports were ignored by the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the 1980s. 
Their policies were characterised by the neoliberal agenda which were imposed 
uniformly any country that needed aid. Tightly conditional structural adjustment loans 
and a little grant aid, it was believed, would achieve economic development (Riddell 
2007). These policies known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), were 
designed to encourage developing countries to follow market oriented strategies. State 
control was weakened, currencies floated, state enterprises sold off, economies opened up 
to investment. (Thomas in Baylis and Smith 1997). The effect in Africa was devastating 
and did not reverse overall; African economic decline (Riddell 2007). 
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1990s and 2000s 
In 1989 the Cold War unexpectedly ended with the collapse of Communism. This had 
two effects on Africa. America and Western Europe concentrated on restructuring former 
communist states in Eastern Europe. Africa was largely ignored. The western recipe for 
Africa was multi party democracy and structural adjustment towards a free market system 
British aid was cut and old Cold War allies, many of them dictators, were abandoned. A 
few were overthrown. Others organised elections which they won. This at least created 
space for a new debate about aid. 
The end of the Cold War opened a unique political opportunity at the international level to take a 
fresh look at the nature and functioning of the aid ~ystem, and to re-orient it from a system based 
mostly on geo-strategic interests to one with a greater focus on the reduction of global poverty 
levels (De Renzio and Mulley 2006: I). 
Human rights assumed a central position in the discourse surrounding international 
development (Gready and Ensor 2005). Development assistance was increasingly seen as 
a right and developed countries increasingly demanded good governance and the 
democratisation of developing countries as a condition for assistance (Jonsson 2005). 
Another fundamental shift in aid was brought about by the establishment of targets. King 
and McGrath refer to the 1990s as the "decade of the world conference" (2004:23). Table 
1 shows the 10 world conferences that took place throughout the 1990s. 
I Year Conference Year Conference 
]990 Education 1995 Social Development 
1990 Children 1995 Women 
1992 Environment 1996 Human Settlements 
i 1993 Human Rights 1996 Food Security 
11994 Population 1997 Climate Change 
Table 1. World Conferences held in 1990s 
These conferences greatly impacted on the 1996 Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD and its development strategy Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of 
Development Cooperation (OECD 1996). This strategy document is considered to be the 
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basis of for the new approach to aid effectiveness. De Renzio and Mulley provide a 
succinct summary of the strategy: 
Shaping the 21st Century outlined a clear shift in the aid paradigm, based on a change In the 
conception and language of aid. .. In order to enhance the role and effectiveness of development 
assistance, it was necessary tofocus on building more effective partnerships between donors and 
recipients, with joint responsibilities and mutual commitments. In particular, donors shouldfoclls 
their efforts on low-income countries, rely on locally-owned development strategies and support 
government programmes as much as possible, avoiding project proliferation and shifting to 
programme-based approaches. Recipient governments, on their side, should create effective 
coordination mechanisms for managing development assistance, and improve their systems for 
managing public resources and monitoring development outcomes (De Renzio and Mulley 2006:4) 
Shaping the 21st Century was followed by the creation of the International Development 
Targets (lOTs). A new architecture of aid came to dominate the approaches of many 
donors to development aid (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003). The lOTs focused on poverty, 
education, gender equality, mortality and the environment. The United Kingdom's 
Department for International Development (DFlD) has built its strategy around these 
targets. Later formulated as the Millennium Development Goals (tvIDGs), they were 
officially adopted at the United Nations General Assembly at the Millennium Summit 
(Figure 3). There are eight goals and 2 J targets all to be achieved by 2015. 
Figure 3 Millennium Development Goals 
1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2) Achieve universal primary education 
3) Promote gender equality and empower women 
4) Reduce child mortality 
5) lmprove maternal health 
6) Combat HIV/AfDS, malaria and other diseases 
7) Ensure environmental sustainability 
8) Develop a global partnership for development 
. (Source: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoaisl) 
The MDGs provide international development objectives that focus on poverty, debt 
relief and fairer international trade rules. They set targets against which donor agencies 
can set their own goals and measure their effectiveness. They provide a "means for 
developing countries and their development partners to work together: (Ban Ki-Moon 
2007:3) 
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The MDGs were followed by further commitments from donor governments. The 
Monterrey Consensus, agreed in 2002, saw pledges by donor governments to increase aid 
and debt relief to the poorest countries (Monterrey Consensus 2002). In 2003 the Rome 
Declaration the donors agreed to harmonise aid and stressed the importance of 
accountability (Rome Declaration 2003). And later they expressed support for the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), a strategic framework for Africa which 
echoed the global development agenda (King and McGrath 2004). The G8 made Africa 
its focus at a series of meetings; Kananaskis in 2002, Evian in 2003 and Gleneagles in 
2004 when the UK established a Commission for Africa to report on new ideas for 
development and to highlight the need for further increases in aid and debt relief 
(Commission for Africa 2005). The report, published in 2005, demanded that 'top 
priority must be given to scaling up services needed to deal with the catastrophe of HI V 
and AIDS" (2005: 186). Aid donors also signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Efficiency 
which made mutual accountability a key component. This new approach can be seen as 
the new architecture of aid. 
The new architecture of aid 
A rights-based approach 
Traditionally, aid was provided within the framework of meeting 'needs'. Today 
increasingly, development is viewed and approached through the vision of human rights 
(Riddell 2007:6). 
The new architecture of aid is founded on a rights-based approach; ''the idea that all 
people are citizens with rights, rather than passive beneficiaries of aid" (Eyben and 
Ferguson 2004: 163) It was acknowledged that "managing aid spending was only one 
(and arguably not the most important) part of development policy, and that the new 
department had a legitimate voice in the formulation of government policy in other areas 
(e.g. trade, conflict and foreign relations) for which other government departments had 
primary responsibility" (Barder 2005: 14). According to Eyben and Ferguson "One of the 
issues highlighted by a rights approach is that of accountability. The idea that individuals 
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have rights implies that governments and others have corresponding legal and moral 
obligations, and that they can be held to account for their actions to fulfil those 
responsibilities. In particular, the emphasis on equality in rights-based approaches 
highlights the importance of accountability to the poorest" (Eyben &Ferguson in Groves 
& Hinton 2004: 163). 
The new architecture of aid calls for developing a global partnership for development 
and accountability of institutions was one of the three conceptual pillars of the Social 
Development Strategy of the World Bank (World Bank 2004). 
Poverty as the root cause of the problem 
Poverty is now seen as the root cause of all problems in the developing world (Riddell 
2007) and its abolition is the main objective of all donor governments (Christiansen and 
Rogerson 2005). In order to achieve this, much of the development discourse emphasises 
the need to embrace globalisation and market forces whilst supporting efforts aimed at 
poverty reduction. Donors generally perceive macroeconomic stability, growth, good 
governance and social inclusion as the key factors in reducing poverty. Aid effectiveness 
is seen as central to poverty reduction. 
Aid effectiveness as the solution 
The most important component of the new architecture of aid "has been the growing 
recognition that the impact and effectiveness of aid is crucially dependent upon political 
structures and processes of the country to which it is given, and that weak clientelistic 
states, in particular, provide a particularly difficult environment for aid to be effective" 
(Riddell 2007:7). 
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A new language of aid 













Figure 4 A new language of aid (Source: De Renzio and Mulley 2006:4) 
From donors and recipients to Partner countries 
Instead of using the tenns "donors and recipients", governments now call themselves 
'partners'. This suggests a new, more equal relationship where both sides work together 
to drive forward successful and sustainable development and achieve the MDGs. 
Partnership is intended to create a sense of 'shared' responsibilities and to foster mutual 
accountability, a concept that first surfaced in the Millennium Summit Declaration in 
2000 and remained high on the agenda in the Monterrey Consensus and in the 
Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations. 
From donor-led to Country-led strategies 
Traditionally they dictated policy but donor governments are now committed to aligning 
their programmes to the development plans and strategies of recipient countries (Riddell 
2007). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PSRPs) are drawn up to demonstrate sound 
economic management and good socio-political governance. In theory they are produced 
by the recipient countries in consultation with interest groups such as civil society 
organisations (CSOs). In practice, many are said to be driven by the donors perhaps 
because PSRPs must meet the donors' own accountability requirements. Donors provide 
recipients with "capacity building" and "technical assistance" to ensure their own 
requirements are met. Donors also promise greater harmonisation and coordination but 
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these are difficult for recipients to enforce since recipients are but one (weak) 
government while donors are many and much more powerful. 
South Africa, classified as a middle income country (MIC), does not qualify for aid under 
the PSRPs but donors still expect to support the development strategies of South Africa 
and others in that category. Donors continue to support MICs because economics alone 
does not adequately reflect the need of a country. Some MICs have a very unequal 
distribution of wealth and consequently the poorer majority often do not have adequate 
healthcare, education access to other resources outlined in the MDGs. South Africa has 
the largest number of people infected with HIV in the world and therefore walking away 
on the grounds that macro-economically it is middle income is not an option. 
In many countries, both MICs and Lower Income Countries (UCs) if donors do not like 
what the recipient government is doing they channel aid away from the government and 
give it to international non-governmental organizations (£NGOs) and civil society 
organizations (Held and Mepham 2007). These bodies then apply pressure on the 
government to bring about change. 
From conditionality to ownership 
Aid has always come with strings attached. "All aid donors, both official and non-
governmental, have an obligation to ensure that the funds they provide are used for the 
purpose intended, and that they are utilised as efficiently and effectively as possible. 
Conditionality has been one means to try and ensure this happens" (Riddell 2007:235). 
Traditionally donors stated explicitly how their aid should be used. If these requirements 
were not met, donors withheld or withdrew that aid (Riddell 2007). Now, most donors 
believe that by enabling recipient countries to design their own strategies, based upon the 
MDGs, aid will be more effective (Birdsall, Williamson and Deese 2002). So they 
encourage recipient governments to draw up their own development plans. Conditionality 
still exists, but donors have broadened the focus from the SAP's macroeconomic 
conditions, to include political and institutional change, as well as social and 
environmental policy. 
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From Project aid to Programme Assistance, technical assistance and capacity building 
In the past donors tended to prefer project aid which enables them to support "predefined 
discrete projects that they can describe to their taxpayers' representatives and claim 
credits for with the public of the recipient country. This is especially true of bilateral 
donors, who have been the largest providers of aid to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPCs) and sub-Saharan African countries in the past two decades" (Birdsall, 
Williamson and Deese 2002:69). Recently however, donors have favoured programme 
assistance over projects. Programme aid can be either a sectorwide approach (SWAp) or 
direct budget support. A SWAp involves donor support for a specific sector such as 
health or education. Budget support is used to increase funding overall, usually 
channelled through ministries of finance (general budget support) or through specific 
sectors (sector budget support) (Riddell 2007). Budget support is provided to countries 
which donors believe have good governance practice. 
Greater emphasis on harmonisation and coordination has led to more partnership budget 
support. According to Riddell this is where the "funds provided constitute a 'partnership' 
with the recipient government involving dialogue concerning the overall thrust of 
expenditure and the provision of technical assistance. Meanwhile in the wider context 
there is greater harmonisation and alignment of policies and practices". (2007: 199). 
Technical assistance (TA), the provision of know-how in the form of personnel, training, 
research and associated costs (Hanlon 1991) is popular with donors as they can ensure 
that the resources they provide are implemented successfully. TA is often accompanied 
by capacity building, now commonly known as capacity development (Riddell 2007). 
Capacity development is "the process by which individuals, groups and organisations, 
institutions and countries, enhance and organise their systems, resources and knowledge; 
all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve 
problems and achieve objectives" (OECD 2006b: ). 
From fragmentation to Coordination 
The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) demonstrated donors' commitment to 
coordinating the provision of aid to make it more effective. A more harmonised approach 
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from donors makes it easier for recipient governments to absorb funds and spend them 
effectively. They can then report to one source rather than many. The emphasis is on 
sharing objectives and responsibilities for outcomes. Greater coordination encourages 
mutual accountability. 
From 'Upward' to 'Downward' Accountability 
Donors may have distanced themselves from conditionality but they need to find other 
ways to ensure that funds they provide are used for the purpose intended, efficiently and 
effectively. Recipient governments are expected to improve accountability to their 
citizens (OECD 2007). Donors too are accountable to their own domestic requirements 
but now also wish to be accountable to the recipient governments and to the people they 
help. This is 'downward' accountability. Many donors have said they wish to operate this 
under an internationall y agreed human rights framework. 
DFID and the New Architecture of Aid 
In 1997 UK aid and development policy was transformed by the establishment of the 
Department for International Development (DFID) which was launched by the Foreign 
Secretary, Robin Cook, with the commitment to 'work through international forums and 
bilateral relationships to spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy' 
(The Guardian 12/0511997). 
Robin Cook emphasised the ethical dimension of foreign policy and declared that the 
Labour government would put human rights at its heart (Groves and Hinton 2004, Held 
and Mepham 2007). Clare Short accepted the position of Secretary of State for 
International Development on condition that she was given a seat in Cabinet and that she 
was responsible for development policy as a whole, not just aid (Barder 2005). 
Today DFID is responsible for bilateral aid and the funding of multilateral development 
institutions, as well as working with the Treasury to guarantee consistency in aid and 
development policies across all UK government ministries (Riddell 2007, Barder 2005). 
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Poverty reduction is at the heart of aid and development policy and progressed measured 
by targets. Enhancing the quality and effectiveness of aid are DFID's ambition. 
The 1997 White Paper, Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century 
(DHD 1997) prioritised the elimination of poverty and the achievement of sustainable 
development particularly in Africa. The aid budget has tripled over the decade and 90% 
of those resources are now focused in the poorest countries (Held and Mepham 2007). 
The UK has also led international efforts to write off debt of the poorest, most indebted 
countries. It has used the UK's Presidency of the European Union and the G8 in 2005 to 
raise the profile of Africa (Held and Mepham 2007). In 2006 an DECO report held up 
DFID as a model of bilateral development cooperation with a unified government 
approach and coherent policy direction (DECO 2006a). 
The establishment ofDFlD transformed UK foreign aid policy. Its political status has 
been increased and DFlD is represented in Cabinet. There has been a significant upsurge 
in the UK foreign aid budget and its aims and objectives have been clearly laid out in 
White Papers as well as in law. 
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Chapter 5 - DFID and Accountability 
Summary 
This chapter provides documentary evidence of how accountability is both defined and 
applied by DFID. I use publications and official information to look at DFID's 
organisational structure, its position within the UK government, and its international 
commitments. Based on the historical evolution of accountability outlined in Chapter 3, 
this chapter explores DFID's thoughts about its own accountability relationships both 
domestic and international. 
For a democratic government to ensure legitimacy it must be accountable to its own 
people and to independent legally enshrined institutions. It is clear from my conceptual 
framework that locating DFID's accountability relationships within a domestic setting is 
fairly straightforward. Accountability structures are long established, weB defined and 
supported by effective mechanisms. The UK parliament, as a democracy, accepts 
accountability as a key instrument of legitimacy3. DFlD, as part of government, is held to 
account by parliament, citizens and institutions made up of the judiciary, auditors, 
inspectors, controllers and professional peers. These institutions and structure have been 
in place for a long time and are therefore easy to identify and understand. Accountability 
was at the fore of the Labour Party' Manifesto when it came to power in 1997 and 
quickly began applying the concept across all government departments. 
'Accountability' is not only seen by the western democracies as a key instrument of 
legitimacy in their own countries. All countries which aspire to the principles of 
democracy must apply accountability with their nations. Who better to expound this 
vision than the donors? Furthermore, the concept of domestic accountability has been 
expanded to an international level, where donors and recipients are encouraged to form 
J Accountability was a key message in President Barack Obama's campaign, is expounded by the UK 
government. 
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accountability relationships with each other. Applying a domestic concept 
internationally, however, presents a major challenge, as the structures which support 
accountability relationships at a domestic level are absent at an international one. 
Domestic accountability relationsh ips 
As 1 explained in my conceptual framework, accountability at a domestic level is 
relatively unproblematic. Firstly, like almost any large organisation DFID has a 
hierarchical structure of accountability. Secondly, citizens hold their governments to 
account through elections and thirdly, there is usually a principal-agent relationship 
between the government department and parliament. Parliament has the power to demand 
accountability from any government department through legal and political structures 
created to sustain democracy. 
A hierarchical accountability relationship 
Organisations, like DFID, operate hierarchically4. The Minister in charge of the 
department has a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, 
decisions and actions ofthe department including its executive agencies. DFID is 
represented in the Cabinet by its Secretary of State for International Development. The 
Minister appoints Under Secretaries to assist him/her. In 2007/8 DFID expanded its 
ministerial team from one Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to three. The four 
ministers agree to share the responsibility and to be held to account by Parliament. 
Under the ministers a senior civil servant is appointed as head ofthe department. Known 
as the Permanent Secretary this role is to carry out the requirements of the Secretary of 
State. The Permanent Secretary is also accountable to Parliament for the management and 
organisation ofthe department. The Permanent Secretary is also the principal accounting 
officer with a direct responsibility to parliament for his department's expenditure. As 
accounting officer, he or she can object to a ministerial political decision if it is deemed 
to be outside the law. 
4 For a detailed organogram of DFID - http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/organisation/organogram. pdf 
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In DFlD the Permanent Secretary is assisted by four Director-Generals. The first 
Director-General is responsible for Country Programmes, the second for International 
matters, including Europe and donor relations, international finance and development 
effectiveness, and the United Nations (UN), conflict and humanitarian issues. The third 
Director-General is responsible for policy and research and the fourth for corporate 
performance. 
Each government department is managed by a board which carries out the strategic 
framework established by the minister. In DFlD the management board comprises the 
Permanent Secretary, the four directors-general and two non-executive directors5• It is 
collectively responsible for delivering the Public Service Agreement (PSA) on 
International Poverty Reduction and its fundamental purpose is to make DFID more 
effective (DFID 2008). This means ensuring that DFID's financial resources and staff 
are allocated and managed effectively. Within DFID the Management Board has a 
collective responsibility for delivery. Directors are individually accountable for the 
objectives and targets and delegate responsibility to the teams in their department. 
The management board is supported by five standing committees: the Development 
Committee; the Audit Committee (chaired by the two non-executive directors); the 
Investment Committee; the Human Resources Strategy Committee; and the Senior Civil 
Service (SCS) Committee. The committees ensure that DFID operates as effectively and 
efficiently as possible. 
5 The two non-executive directors (one private sector, one senior civil servant from outside DFID) 
provide an external perspective on DFID's work, while understanding DFID's mode offunctioning 
as an organisation 
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Vertical Accountability: To citizens, mass media and civil society 
It is widely accepted that through the UK political system, DFlD, as an executive 
department is accountable to taxpayers in the UK and parliament. This political system is 
founded on and follows the Westminster model. DFID, as part of government, is 
horizontally accountable to parliament and the judiciary and vertically accountable to the 
electorate. 
Horizontal Accountability: To the judiciary and Parliament 
As an executive department, DFID is held accountable horizontally to the judiciary and 
Parliament. Criteria embodied in legislation provide specific directives for a department 
to follow and provides legal authority for a department's expenditure. 
The 2002 International Development Act replaced the 1980 Overseas and Development 
and Cooperation Act. The purpose of this act is to provide the legal authority for most of 
DFfD's expenditure. This act sets out the ways in which money can be spent. Two main 
conditions are outlined in this act. The first condition states that "any development 
assistance must be provided for the purpose of furthering sustainable development or 
improving welfare" and the second that "DFlD must be satisfied that the assistance will 
be likely to contribute to the reduction of poverty" (DFID 2002). The International 
Development Act was followed by the International Development (Reporting and 
Transparency) Law in 2006. This requires the Secretary of State for International 
Development to report annually on various areas, including expenditure on international 
aid, progress towards the UN target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) for ODA by 
2014, and the effectiveness and transparency of aid. 
Horizontal accountability can be delivered by Parliament. Parliament is able to scrutinise 
a department such as DFID through mechanisms which include the National Audit 
Office, select committees, parliamentary questions, and all party parliamentary groups 
42 
(see Table 2 ). Each accountability mechanism operates to different stages of 
accountabil ity. 
Table 2 Domestic Accountability Relationships 
Stages of Accountability 
Accountability Description Reporting Answera bility Enforcea bility 
I" 
mechanism 
The National Audits the 
I 
DFID is required Audits on Reports to Public 
Audit Office accounts of all to provide economy, Accounts Committee 
(NAO) central information. efficiency and who then take 
government effectiveness. necessary action. 
departments and 
agencies, as well 
as a wide range of 
other public 
bodies. 
Public Accounts A select DFID is required Scrutinises Can pass judgements; 
Committee committee of the to provide accounts. suggest changes 
House of information. which are then 
II Commons. Information is imrlemented by also provided by Parliament. 
NAO. I 
International A select Calls the minister Scrutinises Makes 
Development committee of the or another senior DFID's policies recommendations 
Select Committee HOLise of civil servant to and programmes. about how DFID can 
Commons and the· report. Ministers Examines improve practices, 
House of Lords cannot be forced expenditure, strategies, and 
LO attend but admjnistrarion and programmes. Reports 
unheard of them policy for DFID findings to 
not to. Individuals and its associated Parliament who can II can be compelled. bodies. make any necessary 
changes. 
Parliamentary Can be asked in Compel the Scrutinise and Parliament can take 
Questions the House of Minister or senior demand action if necessary. 
Commons, House civil servant to explanations from 
of Lords or at provide evidence. the minister or 
Prime Minister's senior civil 
Questions. May servant on the 
be oral or written. work, policy 
decisions and 
actions of their 
department. 
All Party Groups Informal cross- Invite individuals Do not have the Produce reports 
party groups that and organisations power to demand which are normally 
are run by and for to come and give answers. presented to select 
Members of the evidence on committees. No 
House of selected topics. formal power to 
Commons and tILe enforce any change. 
House of Lords. 
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DFID has its own Evaluation Department which aims to increase accountability to 
parliament and the public: 
Evaluation strengthens DFID's accountability by documenting the allocation, use and results of 
its development assistance and by calling those responsible for policy and implementation to 
account for performance. It is recognised that DFID is part of a collective effort, which makes 
attribution of performance difficult. Evaluation can help to clarify where accountability rests and 
to confirm achievement. DFID's evaluation studies strengthen its accountability not only to the 
British Parliament, but also to the government and public in partner countries, and inform other 
development partners. (DFID 2005c:8). 
One way DFID in which tries to achieve this is by focusing on transparency and opening 
up space and participation and capacity building CDFID 2006a). This involves 
work on the supply side of accountability, to improve the availability and accessibility of 
information on public expenditure and to open up public expenditure processes; and to 
work on the demand side, to build the capacity of civil society organisations to engage 
with public expenditure processes and to facilitate that participation at national, sub-
national or sector levels CDFID 2006a:i). 
In the last year a new Independent Advisory Committee on Development Impact (lACDI) 
has been established to help DFID evaluate the impact of UK aid and advise DFID on the 
overall strategy, approach and priorities being adopted in its evaluation work. According 
to DFID "the role of the committee will be to assure the independence of the evaluation 
function in DFID and the use of evaluation results to enhance delivery and impact of UK 
development assistance,,6. The Chair oflACDI prepares an annual report to the Secretary 
of State. The aim of the IACDI is to use domestic lines of accountability to enforce lines 
of international accountability such as the commitments made in The Paris Declaration 




Ministers and civil servants are also held to account as individuals. Ministers are held to 
account individually through The Ministerial Code7• This fonnalises their accountability 
relationship with Parliament. The four main ways in which a minister is individually 
accountable are to inform and explain; to apologise; to take action; and to resign. Civil 
servants are held to account by the Civil Service Codes: 
The Civil Service Code sets out the framework within which all civil servants work, and the core 
values and standards they are expected to uphold. Itforms part of the terms and conditions of 
employment of every civil servant (Civil Service Code 2006). 
Employees at DFID are also held to account by the Blue Book: Essential Guide to Rules 
and Tools (2006b). The Blue Book sets out the core infonnation about how to do things 
in DFID. It explains the rules governing key corporate activities including programme 
management, finance, people management, security, IT and propriety. 
Building domestic accountability relationships in recipient countries 
generates more robust accountability relationships for DFID 
Donor governments, including DFID, consider domestic accountability in recipient 
governments essential for the provision of effective aid. Donors like DFID place great 
importance on "improved accountability relationships between a partner developing 
country and its own citizens" (Rome Declaration 2003). Making recipient governments 
accountable to their own populations and parliamentary structures provides legitimacy 
and should make governments less corrupt. Greater domestic accountability within 
developing countries therefore provides donors with better assurances on the use of their 
funds (OECD 2003:46). The more assured donors are about the use of their funds, the 
more robust their own domestic accountability relationships become. The established 
view is that donors should support national systems in recipient countries so that 
governments can be accountable to their own citizens rather than to the conditions of 
7 For more information on The Ministerial Code see 
http://wv.w .cabinetofli ce.gov .uk/medialcabinetoffice/propriety and ethics/ assets/ministeri al code current. 
QQf 
8 For more information on The Civil Service Code see 
http://wv.w.cabinetoflice.gov.uk/propriety and ethics/civil service/civil service code.aspx 
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donor agencies: 
The way aid is delivered can create an unnecessary burden on partner countries, under efforts to 
build partner country capacity and weaken partner government leadership and its accountability 
to its own people (DECD 2003: /6). 
However, in order to support domestic accountability donors must align their strategies 
with those of the recipient government. There is a "need for OAC donors to focus their 
assistance ... in a way that strengthens local structures of accountability" (World Bank 
2008: 104). 
OFIO is committed to "helping to build states that work for the poor" COFIO 2006c:8). 
As part ofthis, OFIO wants to promote accountability in recipient countries. OFID 
defines accountability as "the ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to 
scrutinise public institutions and governments and hold them to account" COFIO 
2006c:22). According to DFID, domestic accountability means "being answerable for 
what is done" through mechanisms which include: 
• Offering citizens the opportunities to check the laws and decisions made by 
government, parliament or assemblies. 
• Encouraging a free media and the freedom of faith and association. 
• Respecting human rights and making sure the 'rule of law' is upheld, for example 
by an independent judiciary. 
• Providing regular opportunities to change leaders in peaceful ways. 
Source: OFIO 2006c:22. 
OFID claims that building domestic accountability structures in recipient countries will 
ensure that aid is delivered more effectively because there will be greater guarantees the 
money is being spent correctly: 
Where accountability is good, audit institutions and parliamentary committees scrutinise the way 
government bodies spend their money and what they achieve. Courts help prevent abuse of office. 
And beyond the formal structures of the state. civil society organisations give citizens power, help 
poor people get their voices heard, and demand more from politicians and government (DFf D 
White Paper 2006c:22). 
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DFlD is eager to facilitate the progress of sound domestic accountability relationships 
across the developing world, particularly in those countries that receive aid from DFTD. 
At the same time, DFID is opposed to conditionality9. Instead DFID contends it is more 
effective to encourage domestic accountability relationships which will in turn bring 
about better governance and consequently greater legitimacy. 
In 2007 DFTD established the Governance and Transparency Fund which aims to 
strengthen governance by supporting public demands for accountability. The Fund is 
worth £100 million over five years, and supports activities based in developing countries, 
working through a variety of local partnerships and networks. It is designed to support 
civil society, a free media, parliamentarians and trade unions - those working to improve 
transparency and enable more effective accountability mechanisms between citizens and 
the state (DFTD 2007:16). Alongside this DFID is committed to helping recipient 
governments to build capability and authority to get things done in a manner which 
reflects the principles of good governance (DFTD 2007). 
Strong domestic accountability relationships for both donors and recipients are 
considered to be crucial to providing more effective aid. The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness emphasises the importance of "enhancing donors' and partner countries' 
respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies, 
strategies and performance" (Paris Declaration 2005: 1). 
Domestic accountability provides the foundation for the accountability principle of 
effective aid. Yet donors assert that it is also important to apply the principle of 
accountability beyond national boundaries: 
We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability - the accountability of States to 
their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the 
present generation to future generations. (Annan 2005: 7) 
Q For more infonnation see DFID publication Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality 
(2005). 
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New accountability: International accountability relationships 
The new architecture of aid is founded on principles of universality, justice, equity, 
democracy, participation, transparency, accountability and inclusion. Commitments to 
these principles, under the new architecture of aid, to improve aid effectiveness, have 
encouraged the development of new accountability relationships which extend beyond 
the nation-state. New accountability has come to represent better donor practice, greater 
transparency, increased trust and more harmonious relationships between donors and 
their partners. New accountability relationships are a great deal more complex than 
domestic accountability relationships because of the absence of formal international 
structures and processes in place to implement accountability. I therefore looked for 
evidence of DFID's evolving definitions and applications of international accountability. 
International accountability relationships includes recipients being held to account by 
donors (this has always been the case with aid money), of donors accounting to other 
donors, and, most recently, of mutual accountability (donors and recipients holding each 
otherto account). 
Recipients accountable to donors 
Evidently, donors hold recipients to account at all times merely because they hold the 
purse strings. It is unlikely a donor will allocate funds to a country whose policies it 
opposes and it is clear that when aid is provided some account of how it is spent will be 
necessary. Certainly, a donor like DFID would rather use a recipient country' own 
accountability relationships as a means of assurance. Where it is judged that a recipient 
government is not fulfilling its domestic accountability obligations money can, and often 
will be, withdrawn or redirected (enforceability). As DFlD, explains: 
Where the government is simply not committed to helping its citizens. we will still use our aid to 
help poor people and to promote long term improvements in governance. But we will do this by 
working outside the government, and with international agencies like the UN and civil society 
organizations ... Where circumstances deteriorate - or improve - the UK will re-assess 
governance. our partners' commitment to the three principles and. where necessary. change the 
way we provide aid (DFlD 2006c:24). 
In order to avoid placing heavy conditionality on recipient governments DFID offers 
support to civil society to encourage the demand side of good governance, monitoring 
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and accountability through the empowerment of citizens and non state actors (DFID 
2006a). 
Donors accountable to donors 
It is now agreed by donors that they themselves must be held internationally accountable 
too. DFID's 2006 White Paper specifically calls for change in the international system to 
provide "greater accountability for developing countries" (2006c: 1 l) and to "monitor and 
hold donors to account on their international commitments" (2006c: 11). The OECD 
conducts Peer Reviews to monitor the commitments made by donors. Donors examine 
each others' policies and efforts approximately once every four years. The Peer Review 
is prepared by a team, comprised of representatives of the Secretariat working with 
officials from two DAC members who are designated as examiners. The country under 
review provides a memorandum setting out the main developments in its policies and 
programmes. Then the Secretariat and the examiners interview officials, 
parliamentarians, as well as civil society and NGO representatives of the donor country to 
obtain a first-hand insight into current issues surrounding the development co-operation 
efforts of the member concerned. Field visits assess how members are implementing the 
major DAC policies, principles and concerns, and review operations in recipient 
countries, particularly with regard to poverty reduction, sustainability, gender equality 
and other aspects of participatory development, and local aid co-ordination. There is 
reporting and answerability but no enforceability. 
Donors accountable to recipients (Mutual Accountability) 
The concept of mutual accountability has gained an ever increasing position as one ofthe 
pillars of international cooperation for development in the past four years, starting with 
the Millennium Summit Declarations, followed by the Monterrey Consensus and the 
Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations. It stems from the recognition that the world 
shares a common objective as far as development and well-being for all is concerned and 
that the policies of both the developed countries and the developing countries are crucial 
for realising that objective (Discussion Paper for the Abuja meeting of 9 and 10 April 
2005). 
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The preferred term for accountability between donors and recipient governments or 
partners is mutual accountability. There is a growing consensus that overseas 
development assistance (ODA) can only work if 'partners' (donors and recipients) are 
mutually accountable. 
DFID has shown its commitment to mutual accountability by signing a number of 
international agreements initiated at the Millennium Summit Declaration, followed by the 
Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations. The following 
agreements, declarations and reviews address the importance of mutual accountability 
and endeavour to explain what this means, none of them address directly how mutual 
accountability should be implemented and the consequences of doing this. 
The Cotonou Agreement 2000 
The Cotonou Agreement regulates aid and trade issues between the EU and ACP 
countries in a 'compact' which emphasises equality, ownership, mutual obligations and 
dialogue. Ensuring "transparent and accountable" management and governance are 
important elements of this agreement (Cotonou Agreement 2000). 
The Cotonou Agreement was signed by all the then 15 members of the European Union 
(EU) and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in 2000 and came into force 
in 2002. The aim of the agreement is to reduce and finally eradicate poverty while 
simultaneously encouraging sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP 
countries into the world economy. It is founded upon four fundamental principles: 
• Equal ity of the partners and ownership of development strategies - This 
essentially encourages recipient 'led' and recipient 'owned' development and 
economic strategies. 
• Participation - The purpose of participation is to encourage actors other than the 
main governments to playa role in the economic development of these countries. 
Civil society, the private sector and local and regional governments are also 
encouraged to take part. 
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• Dialogue and mutual obligations - All signatories have assumed mutual 
obligation and will continue to pursue these through dialogue and cooperation. 
This includes monitoring and evaluation. 
• Differentiation and Regionalisation - Cooperation agreements will be decided 
according to each partner's level of development, needs, performance and long-
term development strategy. The main focus will be regionalisation and special 
treatment shall be given to the least developed countries. 
Source: Cotonou Agreement 2000:9 
This agreement allows African states some representation when it comes to decisions 
when it comes to decisions about how European aid is allocated. The agreement applies 
the reporting and answerability stages of accountability to its framework. Donors and 
recipients are contractually obliged to share information and assess each others' 
performance. Enforcement, however, remains asymmetric. 
Global Monitoring Reports 2002 
In 2002, the World Bank and the IMF, in cooperation with the DAC, UNDP and others, 
developed a monitoring framework to track donor commitments. Annually produced 
Global Monitoring Reports (GMRs) chart progress on key development issues and are 
meant to hold developing countries and their donors mutually accountable for their 
performance. Global Monitoring focuses on how well countries are implementing the 
policies and actions for achieving the MDGs and related development outcomes. It is a 
framework for accountability in global development policy. 
In 2006 the World Bank's Global Monitoring Report underlined the importance of 
accountability, and in particular the principle of mutual accountability: 
Donors and the internationaljinancial institutions must increase aidflows, improve aid quality, 
and better align their support with country strategies and systems. Donors also need to open up 
their markets to the developing world. Developing countries. for their part, must commit to sound 
development strategies and stronger systems of governance to ensure that resources will be 
effectively used World Bank GMR 2006: 1). 
In 2007 the report called for a strengthening of monitoring and accountability 
frameworks and in 2008 the report noted a lack of effective accountability mechanisms 
was still an issue. 
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The 2008 Global Monitoring Report concluded: 
Greater attention needs to be focused on the quality of education and health investments-and to 
the governance and accountability of public programs-if they are to meet MDG objectives ( 
2008:87). 
While the Global Monitoring Reports provide some useful information and analysis for 
donors and recipients, they lack any specific targets or enforcement mechanism. There is 
reporting and some measure of answerability, but there is no enforcement mechanism. 
Africa Partnership Forum 2003 
The Africa Partnership Forum (APF) was established in 2003 as a way of providing a 
more inclusive partnership between the G8 and Africa through NEPAD. It aimed to serve 
as a mechanism for discussing and monitoring policies and strategies and observe 
progress on mutual accountability. The forum focuses on focuses on strategic, political 
and socio-economic issues related to African development and the implementation of 
NEP AD programmes in the context of achieving the MDGs. In conj unction with the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the DAC, the forum monitors commitments 
made against outcomes to produce a Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness. This 
is one of the fi~t successful mechanisms of international accountability for implementing 
reporting and answerability. But as yet, the forum lacks the power of enforceability. 
UN Secretary General's In Larger Freedom 2005 
In 2005 the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for reform of the United Nations 
in a major report called In Larger Freedom. The report, supported by DFlD, refers 
directly to the importance of accountability: 
In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private sector and 
international inslitutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we must ensure that all involved 
assume their responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds. We therefore need new 
mechanisms to ensure accountability - the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to 
each other, of international institutions to their members and of the present generation tofuture 
generations. Where there is accountability we will progress; where there is none we will 
underperform. The business of the summit to be held in September 2005 must be to ensure that, 
from now on, promises made are promises kept. (Annan 2005:7) 
In Larger Freedom also emphasises that aid relationships based on 'mutual respect and 
accountability' is a requirement. Kofi Annan's report calls for donor agencies to deliver 
aid that is "linked to the local needs identified in countries' national strategies and to the 
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achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), not to the interests of 
suppliers in donor countries" (2005: 17). 
At the 2005 World Summit there was a call for substantial strengthening of the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) as the forum where aid issues should be discussed and 
coordinated. Unfortunately, although this UN-based initiative was supported by the 
Secretary General, no specific targets were ever established and therefore no mechanisms 
were built. 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2006 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness focuses on improving the quality of aid 
through a series of reciprocal and agreed commitments and targets. Signed by 110 donors 
and partner countries in 2005, the Paris Declaration positioned mutual accountability at 
the heart of international cooperation. In signing this, DFID agreed to "mutual 
assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments and more broadly their 
development partnership" (OECD 2005:45). 
Figure 5. Mutual accountability as explained in The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness 
Mutual accountability- Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability and transparency 
in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public support for national policies and 
development assistance. 
48. Partner countries commit to: 
Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets. 
Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving in a broad range of development practices 
when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies. 
49. Donors commit to: 
Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities 
to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislature and citizens. 
50. Partner countries and donors commit to: 
Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments. 
DFID affinns its commitment to the Paris Declaration definition of mutual accountability 
in its 2006 Annual Report. It has also published a response to the Paris Declaration, 
DFID's Medium Tenn Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness: Our Response to the Paris 
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Declaration (2006d). In this publication DFID agrees to work with government and other 
donor partners in order to "develop a mutual accountability mechanism which will assess 
progress on improving aid effectiveness and provide joint support to strengthen 
governments' capacity to manage aid effectively" (DFID 2006d:8). 
Furthermore, DFID commits to work with others, and use its resources to influence and 
to push for change in the international system. Included in these changes are greater 
accountability to developing countries and a request for the OECD to monitor and hold 
donors to account on their development commitments: 
"Donors are rarely held to account for their performance nor are their commitments monitored. 
There is emerging evidence that independent reviews of donor performance and agreed 
frameworks for monitoring performance can encourage substantial changes in donor behaviour. 
We therefore need to increase the development and use of robust systemsfor reporting 
effectiveness at country level. This will include partner country monitoring of performance. peer 
reviews and internal performance and monitoring systems (DFlD 2006d: 17). 
Figure 6. DFID's Medium Term Plan on Aid Effectiveness 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
Strengthening Mutual accountability 
46. Encourage greater use of mutual accountability frameworks. We support the introduction on new 
processes to strengthen mutual accountability. In particular we will encourage country led processes for 
monitoring progress against indicators and targets agreed at Paris. We wi1l encourage independent 
monitoring of donor/partner country performance and learn from emerging practice in countries such as 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam. 
47. We will continue to support regional and international mechanisms for mutual accountability and 
encourage the use of in-country generated information and build their capacity to put in place follow up 
action. 
48. We will contribute to global monitoring and evaluation of performance through the DAC. We will do 
this both through self reporting and through the development ofa monitoring system to review progress 
against Paris commitments to feed into reviews of the Paris Declaration in 2008 and 20 10. 
Source: DFID's medium term action plan on aid effectiveness: Our response to the Paris Declaration 
2006:29 London: DFID 
The Paris Declaration states specific comprehensive commitments for both donors and 
recipients which include specific targets that both must achieve. This is however, largely 
still rhetorical as there are no mechanisms to enforce sanctions on those who do not meet 
the targets. 
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The Three Ones 
As well as internationally agreed commitments to improving aid in general such as The 
Rome Declaration and the Paris Declaration, the UK (amongst others) have also agreed to 
a set of commitments with a specific HIV / AIDS focus. In order to improve the 
international response to HIV and AIDS, the UK have agreed to the Three Ones 
principles, a UNAIDS initiative aimed at achieving in each country: one agreed HIV and 
AIDS Action Framework, one national AIDS Coordinating Authority and one agreed 
country-level monitoring and evaluation system. The Three Ones mandate stresses the 
importance of ensuring accountability in the response to HIV and AIDS in terms of 
policy implementation, partner inclusion, and programme outcomes (UNAIDS 2004). 
As with every internationally agreed target, the stages of reporting and answerability do, 
to varying degrees, exist. Yet again, enforceability is lacking. 
Conclusion 
DFID is very clearly held to account domestically. There are clear processes which 
facilitate this. Internationally, DFID is less accountable. This is because the level of 
enforceability is absent in all international agreements on mutual accountability. Donors 
and recipients are, by their very nature, asymmetrical and this means that enabling a 
recipient country to apply full accountability to a donor is not possible. Despite a lack of 
enforceability, reporting and answerability mechanisms are being applied by both 
partners. This partial accountability relationship is a significant step in the right direction 
as these commitments show donors are willing to be more responsive to recipients, and 
allows recipient an opportunity to evaluate the donors. 
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Chapter 6 - DFID's HIV/AIDS strategies in South Africa 
Tackling HIVIAfDS is a top DFfD priority (DFfD 2007:32b) 
Summary 
In this chapter J describe DFJD's strategic response to HIV and AIDS and outline what 
has been done in South Africa. 
DFID had an early vision to respond to HIV and AIDS. In 1999 the UK signed up to the 
International Conference on Population and Development target to "achieve a 25% 
reduction in HIV infection rates among 15-24 year olds in worst affected countries by 
2005 and globally by 20] 0". This was followed in 2000 by the Millennium Summit 
which adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MOGs), one of which aims to have 
"halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV I AIDS" (Millennium 
Development Goals), In 2001, DFID published a Target Strategy Paper: Better Health 
for Poor People which identified HIV I AIDS as one of four key responses needed to 
improve the health of the poorest. This was followed by DFID's Call for Action, a paper 
published in 2003, which called for a stronger, more coordinated response to the 
HIV/AlDS crisis (DFID 2003). Out of these publications came DFID's Taking Action: 
The UK's Strategy for Tackling HJV and AIDS in the Developing World (2004). This is 
the strategy paper which I will focus on in this chapter. 
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An overview of DFID 's aid contribution 
All DFID official development assistance (ODA) in developing countries, including 
HIV/AlDS expenditure, can be generally classified as bilateral, multilateral or 
administrative costs. DFID also channels funding through research organisations and 
civil society. According to DFID, bilateral aid is provided either for use in a specific 
country and directed to the government or organisations carrying out an aid function in 
that country or to institutions, normally in Britain, working in fields related to 
international development (DFID 2007b:353). Multilateral aid is channelled via 
international agencies. DFID does not have direct control over the use and final 
destination of these funds. DFlD administrative costs cover the total cost of delivering all 
DFID's programmes lO . 
DFID Aid Expenditure by Channel 200617 
5% 
, 0 Bilateral 
43% 52% • Multilateral 
o Administrai\€ costs 
Figure 7. DFID Aid Expenditure by Channel 200617 
Source: DFID Statistics on International Development 2007 
As Figure 7 illustrates, over half of DFI D's expenditure is channelled through bilateral 
aid. Africa is the main recipient of bilateral ODA from DFID. In 2005/6, 52.5% of the 
US$8,894 million total was allocated for Africa (OECD 2007b). 
10 They include UK based and local staff, consultants, travel, rents and communications-
anything that does not provide a direct developmental benefit. Other administrative costs cover 
the overseas costs of staff in agreed diplomatic posts concerned with full time aid administration 
and other elements of FCO and CDC administration costs which are related to aid delivery (DFI D 
2008). 
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Figure 8. Gross Bilateral aDA 2005/6 average 
Source: OECD-DAC (http://www.oecd.org/dataoeccll42/53/40039127.giD 
DFID's programming objectives are outlined in The Public Service Agreement (PSA) 
which runs over a three year period. The overall aim of PSAs is the elimination of 
poverty in particular through achievement by 2015 of the Millennium Development 
Goals. The Public Service Agreement provides a set of targets for DFID's work, as 
required by the White Paper, Public Services/or the Future: Modernisation, Reform, 
Accountability (UK Treasury 1998). The current PSA is for 2005-2008 and is based 
around one aim, six objectives and six targets. These cover the work of the Africa 
Division, Asia Division, Europe, Middle East and Americas Division, International 
Division, Policy Division and a crosscutting Value for Money target. Sixteen key African 
countries and 9 key Asian countries are made the focus of the PSA. In 2002/3 the 16 key 
African countries received 88% of total DFI D spend in sub Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Included in the aim of the current PSA is a commitment to combating HIV 1 AIDS and 
Objective 1, Target I, outlines a specific commitment to reducing HIV in South Africa 
(one of the 16 PSA target countries until 2008) (DFID 2004c). 
DFID has prioritised an HIV/AIDS response. "26% of the UK's overall bilateral 
assistance to Africa is spent on AIDS and sexual and reproductive health work" (DFID 
2004a: 19). 
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DFID's Strategic Response to HIV and AIDS 
DFID's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been three-fold: reflecting the 
importance of tackling the epidemic in its high level targets; developing a strategic 
framework for the department to wolk within; and revamping its organisation to better 
reflect current thinking on the most effective approaches to tackling HIVI AIDS" 
(Barnett). The UK government's (and particularly DFID's) priorities for how this money 
will be spent and what it aims to achieve are outlined in Taking Action: The UK's 
Strategy for Tackling HIV and AIDS in the Developing World (2004a). DFID is 
responsible for the implementation of the UK's strategy for HIV and AIDS. Written by 
DFID and published in 2004, Taking Action was the result of DFID' s Call for Action, a 
paper published a year earlier, which called for a stronger, more coordinated response to 
the HIV I AIDS crisis (DFID 2003). To emphasis how important HIV and AIDS issues are 
to the UK government as a whole, the forward is written by then Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair. The main foci of the strategy are to make a financial commitment to increase 
spending to over £1.5 billion over the following three year period (2005-2008), a 
commitment to placing women, young people, children and orphans, and a commitment 
to support governments to improve treatment, care and prevention (DFID 2004a:iii). 
Through internal business plans, working with countries and multilateral partners, DFID 
allocate resources to country programmes, multilateral institutions, research bodies and 
civil society. 
DFID's objectives for tackling HIV and AIDS are outlined in seven main targets (see 
Figure 9.). 
Figure 9. UK Government main targets for tackling HIV and AIDS 
1) 25% fewer young people infected with HI V by 2005 and globally by 2010 
2) Increased access to sexual and reproductive health services for women and girls by 2005 
3) 3 million people, including 2 million in Africa, receiving treatment by the end of2005. 
at least half whom should be women and children 
4) National plans in place to meet the needs of orphans and children made vulnerable by 
HIV and AIDS by 2005 
5) Rapid implementation ofthe Three Ones, linking donor help to national priorities 
6) Increased global investment in HIV and AIDS research, addressing the needs of the 
poor, women and children 
7) On track to slow the progress of HIV and AIDS by 2015 
Source: DFID Taking Action Report 2004: 1 
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DFID acknowledges that these targets are extremely ambitious and unlikely to be met. 
Indeed, the 200S targets were not met. However, it stresses that having targets is still 
important for stressing ambitions and goals (DFID 2004a). 
Tak;ng Action emphasises four approaches to improving the response to HI V and AIDS 
should be improved. These are an increased financial contribution, an improved 
international response, better national programmes and a long term strategy. 
Strategy 1: An increased financial contribution 
Taking Action outlines the UK's commitment to increasing financial contributions both 
multilaterally and bilaterally. The spending target set by Taking Action is £ I.S billion 
during 200S/6 to 2007/8. Over a three year period, the UK government commit to double 
funding to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GF ATM), and over a four 
year period provide £36 million to UNAIDS in support of its global leadership. In that 
same four year period the government pledged £80 million to the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) for HIV prevention, sexual and reproductive health work with 
women. Bilaterally, DFID are the second largest donor for HIV and AIDS (after the US). 
Through DFID, at least £ISO million was granted for programmes to meet the needs of 
orphans and other children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS. 
DFID's bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan Africa rose to £1,107m in 2006/07 from 
£1,097m in 200S/06 (0.9 per cent). Assistance to Asia decreased over this period from 
£943m to £881m (-6.S per cent). In 2006/07 £274m of bilateral assistance was channelled 
through UK Civil Society Organisations. Major recipients included the British Red Cross, 
VSO and Oxfam (DFID 2008). 
DFID's total multilateral programme accounted for £2, 126m in 2006/07 from £1 ,12Sm in 
200S/06 a rise of 23 per cent. In 200617 43 per cent ofDFID's contributions were 
multilateral. The European Commission's development programme received the largest 
amount ofDFID multilateral assistance (£964m), followed by the World Bank (£S92m) 
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and the United Nations (£30Sm) (DFID 200S). "The European Commission (EC) is the 
vvorld's third largest developmcnt aid donor, has a critical role to play. The UK 
Government providcs around 19% of the total EC budget. A key focus of the UK stratcgy 
will be to work with the EC to ensure that its work on AI DS until and bcyond 2006 is 
focused in the best way possible" (DFID 2004a:33). 
DFID Multilateral Spend on Health 05/06 ((millions) 
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Figure 10. DFID Multilateral Spend on Health 2005/06 
Source: DFID 2007c 
It is difficult to obtain exact figures on what DFID has spent specifically on HIV/AIDS to 
date as they are often included in other areas, particularly health. £320m was committed 
for HIV and AIDS and Sexual Reproductive Health in 2003-04 (DFID 200Sc). The health 
sector received the highest share of DFlD bilateral expenditure in 200617 with £490 
million (Annual report 2007). 
Strategy 2: An improved international response 
DFID's pledge to an improve the international response to HIV and AIDS has already 
been demonstrated through its commitment to internationally agreed targets for HIV and 
AIDS, in particular the MDGs, the United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
(UNGASS) Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the International Conference 
on Population and Development (ICPD) agenda as well as UNAIDS Three Ones 
principles. 
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As well as increasing multilateral contributions, this strategy involves OF] 0 working 
with a number of multilaterals II to ensure that all countries have access to funds and 
support in the fight against HIV/AlDS (Table 3.). Part of this commitment to an 
improved international response is to work with multi laterals to increase access to 
essential medicines in developing countries, including for the treatment of HIV and AIDS 
and opportunistic infections. 
Table 3. DFID's financial contributions to key 
multilateral institutions 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
UNDP 140 
UNICEF 100.9 
UNFPA 36.4 23.1 





Asian Dev't Bank 31.7 
African Dev't Bank 57.2 
GFATM 100 
The UK has agreed to the Three Ones principles, a UNAIDS initiative aimed at achieving 
one agreed HIV and AIDS Action Frame\vork, one national AIDS Coordinating 
Authority and one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system in each 
country. Taking Action also outlines DFID's desire to create a 'Fourth One'. This is to 
ensure that there is donor harmonisation at country level. This is to be achieved through 
the provision of a single pooled funding mechanism, to channel all bilateral and 
multilateral support, and reduce the burden on national governments (Taking Action 
2004:36). 
II Multilateral organisations include EC, GFATM, UNA IDS and its cosponsors. World Bank, UNICEF, 
WHO and UNFPA 
62 
The UK's strategy also includes securing an agreement for an International Finance 
Facility and a promise to use their presidency of both the G8 and the EU to put AIDS at 
the forefront of their Africa-focused agenda. 
Strategy 3: Better national programmes 
The UK government has committed DFID to strengthening national AIDS responses led 
by the affected countries themselves. These obligations were reaffirmed when the UK 
agreed to the Three Ones Principles in 2004. In this strategy DFID asserts that successful 
national programmes need to be comprehensive, long-term and must include prevention, 
treatment and care. They must meet the needs of the most vulnerable. Taking Action 
stresses the importance of education in HIV prevention, capacity-building in the health 
sector, as well as providing support to civil society and the private sector: 
Civil society, groups of people with HIV and AIDS, other community groups, NGOs, the 
medical and scientific community, faith-based organisations, business and the media all 
have important roles to play in creating a demand for better leadership and holding 
governments more accountable (DFID 2004a:28). 
In order to ensure national programmes are effective, DFID creates Country Assistance 
Plans (CAPs) for all countries where it provides development assistance programmes of 
more than £20 million. These papers, are produced in consultation with governments, 
business, civil society and others both within the country concerned and in the UK. They 
outline the ways in which DFID proposes to achieve international development targets in 
the country in question. CAPs are normally intended to cover a three to four year period. 
Not all spending is centrally determined. Many projects are agreed at the country level to 
reflect local circumstances. 
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In order to drive successful national plans the UK government strategy makes it clear that 
it is necessary to have a supportive environment: 
Leadership outside government - from faith-based organisations, people with HIV and AIDS, civil 
society, women and the private sector - is also key (DFID 2004a:50). 
Furthermore, DFID emphasises the significance of providing a multifaceted response to 
HIV and AIDS. According to DFID any response to HIV and AIDS should go beyond 
heath addressing the broader causes and effects. AIDS prevention is therefore a major 
focus of any programme: 
AIDS impacts on education, social structure, cultures and economies and therefore effective HIV 
prevention therefore requires strong community engagement, social change and good 
communication to support individual choices (DFID 2004a:43). 
DFID focuses on those who may not have the power to make individual choices, in 
particular the UK's strategy for tackling HIV and AIDS in the developing world involves 
tackling violence against women, supporting children orphaned and other young people 
made vulnerable by AIDS (DFID 2004a:5). In order to achieve this DFID works to 
ensure that these issues are part of national government strategies that provide care and 
treatment programmes for parents in order to reduce and delay orphaning. 
In its efforts to support better national programmes DFID implements policy on sexual 
and reproductive health through country governments and partners in four main ways: 
improved policies, better access to services, fewer barriers and more information (Figure 
I 1). 
Figure 11. DFID Policy on Sexual and Reproductive HeaUh and 
Rights 
• Advocate internationally and nationally for policies, plans and resources that 
address people's rights to sexual and reproductive health, and continue to 
address controversial issues such as safe abortion and harmful and coercive 
practices. 
• Improve access to comprehensive services that are responsive to the rights and 
needs of poor people and other vulnerable groups. 
• Address social, cultural and economic barriers, using a rights-based approach, 
and tackle factors outside the health sector. 
• Support research, monitoring and evaluation and apply knowledge and lessons 
learnt in policy and planning. 
Source: DFID 2004a:45 
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DFID does not directly provide treatment and care programmes because it considers 
supporting stand alone programmes undermines national responses. The UK's strategy 
allows DFID to support initiatives that persuade national governments to both set and 
own plans (Figure 12). It does this at both a regional and in country level. 
Figure 12. DFID Policy on HIV Treatment and Care 
• Involve all sectors of government and society 
• Are pro-poor, equitable and gender- and child-focused 
• Involve individuals and communities affected by HIV in decision making 
• Help to strengthen the systems that deliver health services, and support prevention and impact-
mitigation efforts 
• Promote alignment at the country level, and harmonisation at the international level (the Three 
Ones) 
I • Are informed by evidence, and consistent with broader developmental objectives. 
, Source: DFID 2004a:45 
Taking Action encourages DFID to use both financial support and advice to governments 
so that they can build successful responses to HIV and AIDS. 
Strategy 4: A long term response 
In order to ensure that aid is both long term and predictable, the UK strategy proposes 
that the International Finance Facility (IFF) be expanded to channel funds for treatment 
and research. A major component of the UK's long term strategy is research. 
DFID's strategy strongly supports increased support for research and development into 
microbicides, treatments and new technologies. The UK government pledges to: 
increase the share of its bilateral resources dedicated to poverty reduction budget support where 
conditions are appropriate ... to enable governments to take long term responsibility for their AIDS 
responses (DF/D 2004a:58). 
The UK's strategy assures DFID's commitment to a long term approach to funding, yet 
funding cycles only cover a three to five year period. DFID accepts this and offers 
reassurances of more sustainable funding as a solution to this problem. 
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DFID's national programme in South Africa 
Despite being classified as Middle Income, South Africa continues to receive significant 
amounts of donor funding. This is largely due to the country's high prevalence ofHIV. 
"In some middle-income countries, such as South Africa, AIDS has already reached 
epidemic proportions. This has significant consequences for the wider region. We are 
equally concerned about prevalence in countries where the state is weak or has failed" 
(DFID 2004a:31). Since 1997 DFID has given £ 122,217,241 projects in South Africa 
which have an HIV/AIDs element. DFID has committed R493 million to South Africa 
for the period 2002-2008 (Harinder 2003). 
Until 2006 South Africa was one of the top 20 recipient countries of UK net bilateral 
ODA, receiving £48 in 2004 and £39m in 2005 (DFID 2007c). In 2006 six of the top 10 
recipients of gross ODAIOA were African including South Africa. 
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Figure 13. Top Ten Recipients of Gross ODAIOA (USD millions) 
Source: OECD-DAC Peer Review of the UK 2006 
Tn South Africa funding for HIV and AIDS is split between National and Provincial 
Government, Civil Society, UNAIDS SA and the Private Sector to improve capacity and 
support the implementation of national AIDS strategies. Three main areas of focus are 
prevention, care, and reducing the overall social and economic impact of HI V and AIDS. 
Prevention includes, for example, supporting the South African government's free 
condom programme, promoting behaviour change and helping to improve the treatment 
of sexually transmitted diseases. 
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Obtaining information about what policies DFID actually implements in South Africa 
was particularly difficult. This is supported by an evaluation of Taking Action which 
concluded: 
The ahsence of a monitoring framework with clear indicators in Taking Action makes it difficult to 
assess rigorously the extent to which the distrihution of current UK-supported HIV and AIDS 
activities reflect priorities in the strategy. Ohtaining disaggregated iriformation on how DFID 
funds are spent on HIV and AIDS is difficult, because of the instruments usedfor funding, e.g. 
sectoral and budget support, and because current systems do not track this information (DFID 
2006j). 
I was however, able to establish that DFID operates three programmes in support of those 
who are HIV positive in South Africa, They are: 
A £30 million, four-year multi-sectoral framework programme on HIV I AIDS 
which works with partners in national and provincial governments, civil society 
and the private sector to strengthen the South African response to HIV/AIDS.-
HLSP. 
A commitment of £ 13 million over five years to the South African multimedia 
NGO called 'Soul City' for its HIV I AIDS prevention work and to support its 
expansion into a further eight countries in the region. - 2008 £ 14m over 4 years. 
£20 million over three years to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for 
their work with orphans and vulnerable children in east and southern Africa, 
South Africa is one beneficiary of this grant. 
There are obviously other policies that DFID implements in South Africa as its recorded 
spend for HIVI AIDS is much higher in official documentation (DFID 2007b). However, I 
was unable to access any specific information about DFID's exact spend. It is not 
possible to isolate what exactly happens to DFID's funds for UNICEF but information 
about the multi-sectoral programmes and Soul City are outlined below. 
Multisectoral Support Programme (MSP) 
DFID has focused support on comprehensive multi-sector national responses to provide 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care services along with impact mitigation. 
Depending on the context, a range of approaches has been used, including support to 
strengthen government and civil society responses and direct service delivery via UN and 
civil society agencies (DFID 2007b: 327). 
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DFID supports a multi-sectoral HIV and AIDS support programme which is implemented 
on its behalf by HLSP, a health consultancy. The MSP was started in 2004 (HLSP has 
been running this since October 2007) with the aim of employing the international 
community to improve the response to HIV and AIDS in South Africa: 
The MSP is designed to assist partners so that they can develop, implement, monitor and 
evaluate their H IV I AIDS plans as well as strengthening the relationship between national 
and provincial government departments (http://www.hlsp.org I) 
In keeping with the South Africa Government's National AIDS Plan, the MSP's target 
areas are as follows: 
Prevention of HI V and AIDS through civil society and public sector programmes. 
111 V and AIDS treatment, care and support. 
Strengthening key components of the South African health system and structures 
including Monitoring and Evaluation Operations Research. 
Strengthening policy dialogue on human rights and the legal environments for 
vulnerable groups. 
HLSP has partnerships with government departments, in provinces and across sectors. 
Service providers, comprised of private consulting firms, civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and research institutions are employed to implement projects. Figure 14 provides 
examples of some of these partnersl2. 






















12 For a full lis! of partners and project implementers - htlp:l/www.hlsp.org/ 
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It is interesting to note that HLSP do not make available information on all 170 projects, 
and it does not reveal any information about how much is spent on individual projects. 
Soul City 
DFlD has worked to develop a 'toolkit' aimed at strengthening the capacity of 
community-based organisations to provide care to HIV and AIDS sufferers. One way 
DFID does this is through its support of 'edutainment', designed to address a variety of 
health and social issues. DFID provides funds to the 'Soul City' project and its child 
friendly project, 'Soul Buddyz'. These projects advocate "social change in individuals 
and communities through edutainment - the integration of social issues (prioritised 
through research findings) into popular and high-quality entertainment" 
(hltp:ll\vww.soulcity.org.zalprogrammes/the-soul-buddyz-series/soul-buddyz-series). 
DFID has supported Soul City for the past 13 years and has just this year committed a 
further £ 14 million to Soul City and Soul Buddyz over the next four years. 
Conclusions 
By end December 2008 DFID will have spent approximately £30million in support of the 
South Africa's response to HIV and AIDS. It is impossible to gain access to information 
about DFID's specific spending for HIV/AIDS. Its new programme on AIDS in South 
Africa is currently in design stage but DFID says it expects to spend £26m over 5 years. 
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Chapter 7 - Results and Discussion 
Summary 
Based on a combination of the evidence presented in Chapter 6 and my interviews with 
informants, purposively selected for their positions in the policy cycle (see Chapter 2), I 
argue that there is sufficiently persuasive evidence to suggest four key findings about the 
consequences ofDFID's embrace of the new language of aid and the new accountability 
for its work in the case of South Africa. Firstly DFID has an excellent reputation because 
it undertakes to apply the principles of the new architecture of aid - they talk the talk. 
Secondly, circumstances in South Africa present a challenge to DFID's application of 
these principles. Thirdly, as a result of circumstances DFID has had to modify its 
response in South Africa - they can't quite walk the walk of the new architecture of aid. 
Finally, these responses have had consequences for DFID's accountability relationships 
both with the South African government (mutual accountability) and within its own 
country (domestic accountability). 
Reputation 
Firstly, DFID has an excellent reputation and is well respected for adopting sound 
principles. DFID's outstanding reputation amongst the aid community is affinned by my 
infonnants who acknowledge that OFID is widely accepted as a model donor. 
Informants' sense there is an expectation that DFID will "do the right thing" (R2). 
There is a strong value system in OFID. DFIO's core values apply right across the 
system. DFID's staff have integrity. There is a clear hierarchy of goals (R3) 
Much of this respect derives from DFIO's adoption of the language of the new 
architecture of aid and its application of this language when dealing with its South 
African partners. DFIO has played a leading role in both promoting the principles of the 
new architecture of aid and implementing them in practice. DFID's applies the principle 
of ownership, directs aid towards capacity building and devolves responsibilities to staff 
in country so that they can have a more flexible response on the ground. 
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Ownership 
From the evidence presented in Chapter 6 it is clear that DFID recognises that an 
effective response to HIV and AIDS will only be successful if countries develop and 
commit to strong nationally developed and led plans (DFID 2004). Consequently, DFID 
works with recipient countries to develop nationally owned strategies. The application of 
this principle means that DFID is recognised as paying due respect to the host cotmtry, 
and really attempts to get local buy-in. According to one informant, DFlD is "a good 
donor, concerned with local buy in and consultation" (R4). 
DFID consults with governments, business, civil society and others in recipient countries 
to provide aid that reflects local circumstances: 
DFJD would not agree a programme that was not negotiated with a partner country. Consultation 
is vital. One thing partners so highly appreciate about DFi D is that they respond to the needs of 
the country. DFJD supports national plan.s which allows for a better response (RJ) 
DFID follows country-led approaches to development as part of its support for the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to ensure that programmes do not undermine national 
responses to HIV and AIDS. DFID stresses the importance of working in partnership 
with mutual goals and accountabilities. 
Capacity building 
DFID's concentration on facilitating capacity building is seen as a way to follow the lead 
from the host country. Building capacity is critical to making aid more effective and 
absorbing larger amounts of aid, since it is at the heart of the closely interrelated strands 
of achieving the MDGs and realising the principles of the new architecture of aid. The 
need for supporting sustainable capacity development is identified by DFID as crucial. 
DFID works to provide high level technical assistance to countries affected by HIV and 
AIDS. Informants described their approval ofDFID's approach to supporting recipient 
countries. For example, one informant noted: 
Strengthening government and capacity is a core of what DFiD does. DFJD works directly on 
technical assistance, evidence based policy making and governance. DFJD works to build a strong 
policy-making environment (R3) 
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Budget support is also perceived as a good aid instrument because it supports nationally-
led strategies (one of the principles of the new architecture of aid and a precondition of 
mutual accountability relationships). According to one respondent: 
DFID would rather give budget support and make sure a government has a good national strategy 
in pla,·e. DFID see budget support as a long term sustainable way offunding much more so than 
others (R4) 
This sentiment is echoed by other respondents who agree that "this helps build secure 
relationships with partners" (R2) and "allows for a better response" (R3). 
Devolved responsibility 
DFID's devolved approach to decision making in-country is seen as a core strength. The 
autonomy afforded to country teams has enabled DFID to adopt a flexible approach to 
HIV / AIDS programming and many decisions are made by country teams without having 
to seek permission from superiors. Such flexibility allows DFID to be highly responsive 
which is crucial in countries affected by HIV and AIDS because epidemics create new 
issues all the time. Devolution also allows DFID to be more innovative; it can invest in 
up-to-the-minute ways of responding to the epidemic. Respondents praised DFID for its 
flexible approach: 
The flexibility of DFiD is highly appreciated by partners because it is better able to deal with 
unforeseen needs (R3). 
Giving aid in this way is, in theory an excellent approach and one which on the face of it 
seems fairly unproblematic - provided the circumstances in the recipient country allow. 
In a country like South Africa, the circumstances are such that applying the principles of 
the new architecture of aid becomes more complex. 
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Circumstances in South Africa: A challenge for DFID 
Applying the rhetoric of the principles of the new architecture of aid to practice has been 
problematic in a country like South Africa. 
A Middle Income Country 
South Africa is classified as a middle income country (MIC) and therefore is not eligible 
for the same funding as if it were a lower income country (UC). Since its classification 
as a MIC, DFID has withdrawn South Africa from its list of target countries (under the 
PSA) and it no longer receives significant amounts of aid. DFID's approach to MICs is to 
focus on improving the effectiveness of the international system in achieving the MDGs 
in MJCs worldwide (DFID 2004b). 
A controversial response to HIV/AIDS 
As stated in the first part of this chapter, a country's own priorities are at the heart of 
country-led approaches. There is, however, a risk that countries may fail to prioritise HIV 
and AIDS. This has certainly been the case in South Africa. Until recently, South 
Africa's response to HIV and AIDS has placed DFID in a difficult position. This has 
included years of inaction, misinformation and denial within the South African 
government, in particular former President Thabo Mbeki and the Minister of Health, 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. 
South Africa has a per capita income similar to Botswana and Brazil and so should have 
been more capable of dealing with the HIV IAIDs epidemic. However, the government in 
South Africa was slow to respond to HIV I AIDS and since the epidemic began, the 
government has been criticised for its failure to take effective actions against AIDS. The 
lack of a comprehensive and coordinated response by the government and NGOs has 
been exacerbated by Mbeki's controversial stance. Despite a court ruling in July 2002 
that required the government to provide antiretrovirals for infected children the 
government has been slow in meeting these obligations. The South African government 
consistently resisted calls to introduce an AIDS treatment programme until August 2003, 
73 
when the cabinet finally agreed to consider it. Brazil has had a health policy with 
universal access to HAART since 1996 (Nattrass 2004). 
Insufficient capacity 
International and internal pressure, as well as the political imperative of the 2004 election 
compelled the government to act more decisively. In November 2003 the government 
approved a $1.7 billion Comprehensive Nation Plan on HIV/AIDS Care, Management 
and Treatment (AR V s) to more than 1.4 million South Africans by 2008. However, since 
the launch of the initiative, little progress has been made. In June 2004, only 20,000 
people had access to ARV treatment out of 750,000 people in need (Nattrass 2006). 
Access to ARVs has been very uneven across the country as provinces face different 
challenges, including insufficient human resources, lack of training and healthcare 
workers, lack of treatment literacy, delays in the procurement of the drugs and the need 
for specialised equipment. 
These capacity issues present DFID with a dilemma. Working under the principles of the 
new architecture of aid means that DFID has to promote ownership and support country-
led responses to HIV and AIDS. At the same time DFID is compelled to fulfil its own 
objectives and must also meet its own national accountability needs. In South Africa, the 
potential for meaningful mutual accountability relationships with donors has been 
compromised by the government's controversial response to the epidemic. 
DFID can only have a relationship of constructive mutual accountability with a recipient 
that identifies with the principles of the new architecture of aid. A foundation of good 
governance, legitimacy and accountability nationally is necessary for a mutual 
accountability relationship: 
Where DFID has a relationship with a government, its primary expectation would be that there is 
good governance. The 2006 White Paper had an emphasis on good governance. In countries that 
are not well governed DFID will not work with the executive (R2j, 
South Africa's response to HIV and AIDS has certainly affected this mutual 
accountability relationship. Furthermore, informants expressed an additional concern 
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about the structures that are designed to facilitate better relationships in the region as a 
whole. One respondent notes: 
DFlD are responsive to SADC. SADC is dysfunctional, weak and with little capacity. Until SADC 
becomes afunctional institutional structure it is very difficult to sustain a useful relationship. The 
alternative is to build up civil society (R3) 
South Africa's controversial response to HIV and AIDS is not the only reason a donor 
like DFID finds it difficult to follow the principles of the new architecture of aid in 
practice. A constant precondition for aid success is the ability of a government to absorb 
the aid it is given and to spend it effectively. Despite all macroeconomic data for South 
Africa indicating that the country has the capacity to use aid efficiently this has not been 
the case. In October 2005 the South African Press Association reported that the then 
Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang had told parliament that the national 
budget of health would have to roll over R67.2 million that it had not spent on budgeted 
HIV/AIDS projects in the 2004/5 financial year. 
The limitations of the South African government to absorb aid are identified by one 
respondent: 
There is no health sector pot, no mechanism for South Africa to have money delivered directly to 
the government (RI) 
South Africa's lamentable response to HIV/AIDS and its inability to spend aid effectively 
has created an uncomfortable relationship with the donors. This has challenged DFID's 
approach. It has been unable to establish mutual accountability relationships with the 
South African government. 
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DFID's HWIAIDS policy in South Africa 
Clearly, because South Africa is a middle income country, certain means of providing aid 
are not open to DFID which they would be if South Africa was a developing country. 
This combined with the fact that South Africa does not have the capacity to deal with 
large amounts of aid for HIV and AIDS and its controversial response to the epidemic 
have impacted on the way DFID provides aid to South Africa. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, aid for HIV and AIDS in South Africa provided by DFID is not 
provided directly in partnership with the recipient government. Instead, DFID delivers 
aid through multilateral organisations, the private sector and civil society. 
Multi·]atera] organisa tions 
In South Africa, DFID provides multi-lateral aid to UNICEF to implement South Africa's 
National Action Plan for children affected by AIDS. Funding multi-laterally in this way 
has consequences for both mutual accountability and domestic accountability. Mutual 
accountability can only exist between recipient governments and donor governments and 
therefore by providing funding in this way DFID does not have a mutual accountability 
relationship with the South African government. Furthermore, DFID's domestic 
accountability relationship is weakened because although donors do receive guarantees 
from multi-laterals and donors are represented in multi-lateral organisations, multi-
laterals do not have domestic accountability relationships with donor governments. 
Informants did not raise any specific concerns related to accountability as a result of 
DFID's support ofUNJCEF in South Africa. They did however, observe obstacles to 
accountability that had emerged from funding other multi-laterals: 
DFID has problems with the Global Fund being badJ J so it has tofund bilaterally when it would 
like to give multilaterally. Don'tforget. DFlD is still accountable to the taxpayer (R4). 
I \Vhen asked what was meant by bad the respondent referred to a corruption scandal involving money 
from the UF 
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Some noted that multilateral institutions impede accountability to recipient countries 
rather than improving accountability relationships. One infonnant stated: 
The problem with the Global Fund is accountability becomes much more complex - accountability 
to so many stakeholders means that the donors squeeze out the recipients. In theory the GF is very 
progressive. In reality the GF does not have a direct mechanismfor intervening (R3). 
The weakness of the Global Fund's accountability mechanisms was also stressed by 
another infonnant: 
Global Fund's CCM's (Country Coordinating Mechanisms) cannot be construed as accountability 
mechanisms because there isn't a global accountability structure - there is no mechanismfor 
intervening (Rl) 
Therefore, funding multilaterally does present challenges to DFID's accountability 
relationships as there are other contributors whose perspectives have to be accommodated 
and ultimately accountability has to rely on the effectiveness of the control mechanisms 
of the IGOs themselves. 
Private sector consultants 
DFlD also provides aid for HIV/AIDS through a multi-sectoral support programme 
(MSP) contracted out to HLSP, a private health consultancy. An informant revealed that 
DFID uses this approach because it does not have the capacity to deliver this aid directly: 
The MSP involves around 170 contracts with service providers, all of whom had to be managed. 
This is not something that DFlD would be able to do - so HLSP is the managing agency for the 
MSP (Rl) 
Funding through an intennediary with such a high number of contracts surely contradicts 
the Three Ones Principles. It certainly has consequences for DFID's accountability 
relationships. Firstly, in using HLSP, DFID's domestic accountability relationships are 
compromised (as happens when using any intermediary). Secondly, the South African 
government's domestic accountability is weakened as it has to operate programmes in 
accordance with the terms and conditions laid out by the contractor. Finally, this form of 
providing aid inhibits a mutual accountability relationship between DFID and the South 
African government. 
I t is noteworthy that, considering the strategic and monetary value of the relationship 
between DFID and HLSP and the fact that many senior HLSP staff formerly worked for 
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DFID, information about HLSP was very sparse. Nowhere on its website does DFID 
mention its partnership with HLSP and it is only given one sentence in the Annual 
Review. While HLSP staff are quite open about their relationship with DFlD, DFID staff 
are markedly reticent about the role ofHLSP. 
Civil society 
DFlD supports Soul City, an organisation which helps educate people about HIV/AIDS 
through entertainment. Provision of aid to civil society has earned DFI D a great deal of 
acclaim, not surprisingly especially amongst civil society. DFID asserts that civil society 
has an important role to play in creating a demand for better leadership and holding 
governments accountable. It therefore encourages civil society to raise awareness, 
stimulate debate and disseminate information. 
Support of civil society is recognised by the respondents as a key strategy by DFlD. One 
such informant contended that "building up civil society is a valuable way of 
empowering people" (R3). Another maintained that reinforcing civil society is an 
"excellent way of facilitating development" (R 1). 
Respondents generally express approval that DFID try to work with civil society where 
possible. As one respondent notes: 
Any donor needs to respect that people on the ground will very often have better ideas about how 
to spend the money, There are so many examples of seriously bad aid caused by foreign donors 
deciding what's best without understanding local practices. DFID try to consult with all civil 
society organisations (R2). 
Funding civil society, although undertaken to improve aid and bolster domestic 
accountability in recipient countries, can have unintended consequences. Donors run the 
risk of distorting accountability relationships so that organisations become shaped by the 
aims of the donors (Eyben and Ferguson 2004). This is supported by evidence from one 
informant: 
The problem is that recipients need to speak up, Recipients in South Africa don 'tfeel able to tell 
donors what they want because the power dynamic is so intense, It is really dijJicult to get the 
recipients to stand up to donors (R3), 
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Furthennore, this approach to funding does not create or support a mutual accountability 
relationship between DFID and the South African government. 
Consequences for policy 
None of the above approaches to funding support mutual accountability relationships 
and, in some circumstances these approaches weaken both donor and recipient domestic 
accountability relationships. Furthermore, DFID's devolved approach to funding also has 
consequences for accountability, although one infonnant argued that this was countered 
by better aid: 
Theoretically, yes, this does mean that there is less accountability but the benefits outweigh this-
allow a better response. DFID doesn't have preordained actions. It is often the case that the 
things DFID does that are the mostflexible are also the most valuable. lfyoufollow a 
predetermined agenda you cannot meet the needs of the country (R3) 
Accountability, particularly mutual accountability is considered to be a requirement for 
more effective aid. Although the rhetoric has been adopted by almost all major donors, 
the case of DFID shows that there are some real challenges to applying mutual 
accountability in practice. Not least because mutual accountability relationships can 
contradict the objectives of DFID. One informant noted: 
Theoretically DFI D is signed up to mutual accountability but there is a real tension between 
delivering UK objectives and doing what recipients want (R4) 
Furthennore, the universal objectives set by donors are often in stark contrast to the 
principals of the new architecture of aid. For instance, one informant described how 
recipient countries can only own strategies so long as they fit with the MDGs: 
DFID says it promotes ownership - that it wants to get behind national policies/or HIVIAIDS but 
they are signed up to the MDGs and use them as the foundation of their work. The MDGs are 
ideals pushed by donor countries. How can one goal be suitable for all recipients? (R4) 
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Another informant highlighted the apparent contradiction between internationally agreed 
HIV I AIDS strategies: 
There is a contradiction of ideals in DFlD. The MDG's that DFlD set their targets by are pushed 
by donor countries. How is this nationally led? In endorsing the Three Ones in 2005 donors had 
to respect that countries had control of their own strategies. But independently of DFlD, 
ActionAid campaignedfor universal access to treatment, This was supported by other 
international NGOs and was "ompletely out of line with the Three Ones. Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown then endorsed thisfocus on treatment within a set timeframe without any referral to the 
AIDS Policy Team at DFlD. They did this solely as a result of pressure from activists. This 
undermines the ability of countries like South Africa to take control of their own HIV/ AIDS 
programmes (Rl) 
In trying to meet their own requirements for domestic accountability, and at the same 
time provide aid outside of government, mutual accountability relationships are 
compromised. However, mutual accountability relationships are not possible in countries 
where the policies of the donors and the recipients are at odds with each other. This has 
significant implications for the implementation of the principles of the new architecture 
of aid. 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusions 
It is evident that tensions exist between following the principles of the new architecture 
oj aid and implementing policy on the ground, and that these have clear consequences for 
accountability. 
The meaning of accountability is ambiguous. The word has been variously defined in 
terms of transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsibility, integrity, 
responsiveness, governance, corruption and fraud. While the principles of the new 
architecture oj aid are widely apparent in the strategic thinking and policies of OFTO, it is 
more difficult to find evidence of new accountability relationships on the ground. In 
South Africa, where there are explicit policy differences between the national 
government and OFTD, it seems that while OFID talks the talk of mutual accountability, 
it encounters problems in walking the walk. 
Although the particular circumstances of South Africa and HIV IAIDS policy demonstrate 
just how difficult mutual accountability- the hallmark of the new architecture oj aid - is 
to realise, similar problems are likely to occur in other settings too. New accountability 
relationships are a great deal more complex than domestic accountability relationships 
because of the absence of formal international structures and processes which are 
necessary for implementing this new (mutual) accountability. There is no existing 
specification of how donors and recipients are to successfully apply mutual 
accountability nor do they address the possibility that mutual accountability demands 
conflict with domestic accountability demands. 
As such, mutual accountability is currently an ideal. The absence of both a global public 
and global structure to support accountability mechanisms means it is impossible to 
implement mutual accountability. That leaves two possible outcomes for mutual 
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accountability in the future: I have two suggestions for what this might mean for mutual 
accountability: 
I. The structures to support mutual accountability will develop in the future. 
2. The concept of mutual accountability between donors and recipients is fatally 
flawed. This is because donors will always have more power than recipients. In 
the words of Humpty Dumpty: 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose 
it to mean - neither more nor less. " 
''The question is, ,. said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things. " 
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Appendix A - Information Letter 
26 March 2008 
Dear. ........ , 
I am an MPhil Candidate at the University of Cape Town in the Department of 
Sociology. I am working under the supervision of Professor Robert Mattes on the 
following study which is being conducted as part of my MPhil requirements. 
This research project is exploring definitions and applications of accountability and the 
consequences for this on implemented policy. I am using DFID as a case study and am 
specifically looking at what they do in South Africa. 
The purpose of this letter is to request your cooperation as a voluntary participant in this 
study. 
What is the study about? 
This project will use perspectives in the field of political science to inform an 
investigation of DFID and its accountability relationships. 
'J'he aim of this study is to provide a greater understanding of accountability relationships 
and the consequences for implemented HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa. This research 
project will explore whether the wayan organisation understands accountability has 
consequence for the policies they pursue. 
[t is important to stress that this thesis does not in any way attempt to assess the quality of 
the donor. This is not an assessment of DFID. This piece of research is being undertaken 
to provide a deeper understanding of accountability and to explore the relationship 
between accountability and donor strategy. 
How will this study be conducted? 
My methodological approach involves a review of UK foreign policy for aid, including 
research of the key texts, followed by further exploration in their reference sections. I 
have also searched the internet extensively for relevant articles and reports and took 
advice from people in the field of I-IIV I AIDS, aid and Africa. I drew on the UK 
government's websites for much of the documentation. 
Interviews are being conducted to further investigate definitions and applications of 
accountability as well as donor strategies, specifically within DFID. They are designed to 
provide a more detailed understanding of accountability and how it affects policy. 
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Who is being approached to participate in this study? 
Approximately five participants are being sought based on their insight into donors 
(particularly DFID and HJV/AIDS strategies, both past and present). I am seeking people 
from across the policy-cycle who have expertise in this field. 
What would you have to do as a participant? 
Participants would have to take part in a one-on-one interview in person (by telephone if 
necessary) at a time that is convenient. The interview may be tape-recorded and later 
transcribed. The interview will focus on your thoughts about the relationship between 
accountability and DFID's strategies (particularly for HIV I AIDS. 
You will be asked permission to be acknowledged in the study, but your name will not be 
specifically attached to particular ideas or quotes. Only my supervisor (Professor Robert 
Mattes) and I will have access to the primary data. Any part of the interview that you 
would like to remain confidential will be maintained as such. 
You will be free to raise questions or concerns throughout the study and may withdraw at 
any time should you so choose. 
Thank you for your consideration. Please contact me at isabelladowden@gmai1.com or at 




Appendix B - Consent Form 
I, , agree to take part in a qualitative study on the donor 
definitions and applications of accountability and the policies they pursue. This study is 
being conducted as part of Isabella Dowden's MPhil requirements through the University 
of Cape Town Political Science department. 
I LUlderstand that, as a participant in the study, I will be interviewed by Isabella Dowden 
either in person or by telephone. I understand that the interview may be tape recorded and 
transcribed. I understand that participating in the study will involve answering questions 
about: 
Foreign Aid 
HIY/AIDS policies, programmes and strategies 
DFID 
Africa (particularly South Africa) 
Accountability 
I understand that the interview will take about 60 minutes and will occur at a time that is 
convenient for me. 
I understand that I will not be identified in the study. Rather, relevant infonnation wiII be 
provided to give context to ideas, such as identifying that a particular perspective was 
raised by someone who works in the HIY/AIDS field. 
I understand that I am under no obligation to agree to participate in the interview. I 
understand that I can refuse to answer any questions I choose, and that I can stop the 
interview at any time or withdraw from the study. I understand that if there is any part of 
the interview I wish to remain confidential, my request will be honoured. 
I understand that Isabella Dowden and her supervisor (Professor Robert Mattes) are the 
only people who will have access to the primary data from the interview. I understand 
that at the end of the study, the data, including audio tapes and transcripts will be 
destroyed. I understand that Isabella Dowden will be seeking to publish the results of this 
research. 
I understand what this study involves and I agree to participate. I have been given a copy 




Appendix C - Interview Guide 
Interview Guide 
General 
1) Do you have a relationship with DFID? 
2) How would you describe this relationship? 
3) How do you understand the term accountability? 
4) How do you think DFID understands accountability? 
Prompts - Reporting? Answerability? Enforceability? 
5) Who do you think DFID sees itself as being accountable to? To 
parliament? Within DFID? To recipient countries? 
6) DFID are encouraging recipient countries to be more accountable? How do you 
think they can do this? 
7) DFID have signed up to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In this the 
term mutual accountability is used - how would you define mutual 
accountability? 
8) How does mutual accountability work for recipient governments? 
9) Do you think DFID's understanding of accountability differs from other donors? 
Ifso how? 
HIV I AIDS - South Africa 
10) How has your work related to the UK's international responses to the global 
pandemic? 
11) How important do you think accountability is in determining DFID's (HIV I AIDS) 
strategies? 
12) To what extent do you think accountability inf1uences DFID's HIVI AIDS policies 
in South Africa/Southern Africa? In what ways? 
13) In what ways does DFID practice mutual accountability in its HIV I AIDS 
strategies in South/Southern Africa? 
14) What do you think about DFID's move from an in-country approach in South 
Africa to a regional approach for Southern Africa (especially in terms of 
HIV/AJDS and accountability)? 
15) If the UK did not support mutual accountability do you think that they would 
follow different strategies? 
16) Are there any HIV/AIDS strategies DFID doesn't pursue because of the way it 
understands accountability? What are they? 
17) Is there anything else you think I should know? 
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